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Abstract 
In recent time Delhi has revealed its ambitions as a global city. The consequent 
need for cheap, casual, migrant labour for maintaining its world-scale 
ambitions has been highlighted in a lot of literature, particularly in the post 
Commonwealth Games (CWG) period. The migrant labourers in the informal 
economy of Delhi are seen as oppressed, particularly if they belong to a 
subordinated social group, like the Muslim male migrants. However, there is 
need to examine the homogenization implied by ‘Muslim male migrants’. This 
research aims to challenge the one-dimensional depiction of Muslim male 
migrants as ‘victims’. Analysing the narratives of two groups of Muslim 
migrant men in a South Delhi neighbourhood, this research tries to critically 
look at stable markers of identity such as ethnicity, gender and class. The 
research reveals identities as fluid, multiple and relational. The men emerge as 
complex subjects—not just passive ‘victims’ but capable of asserting agency, 
often through the strategic mobilisation of their multiple identities.  
Keywords 
Informal economy, men, Muslim men, migrants, Afghan migrants, Bengali 
migrants, rickshaw-pullers, ethnicity, masculinities, multiple identities, feminist 
methodology, urban citizenship, Right to the City, Delhi Master Plan 2021, 
Delhi. 
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Male, Migrant, Muslim1 
Identities and entitlements of Afghans and Bengalis in a 
South Delhi neighbourhood 
1 Introduction 
Since its ‘discovery’ in the 1970s, the concept of informal economy has come a 
long way from being just a residual ‘sector’ in the economies of the countries 
in the global South. (Chen, 2007:235). In its current expanded definition, 
informal economy ‘is comprised of all forms of “informal employment”—that 
is, employment without labour or social protection—both inside and outside 
informal enterprises, including…self-employment [and] wage employment’ 
(Ibid. 235-6). According to the 2007 Report on Conditions of Work and 
Promotion of Livelihoods in the Unorganised Sector (ARC) in India, workers 
in the informal economy comprise over 93% of the country’s workforce. In 
spite of pioneering a law for the protection of unorganized workers 
(Unorganised Workers Social Security Act 20082) on the basis of the ARC, the 
everyday practices as well as the laws in India are far from sufficiently 
supportive of those engaged in making a living from informal employment 
(Harris-White and Prakash, no date). This research examines, broadly speaking, 
the links between the many identities—spanning categories like ethnicity, 
gender and class—of those engaged in earning their livelihoods from the 
informal economy, and their entitlements on the basis of those identities. 
Specifically, I am looking at two groups of Muslim male migrants engaged in 
the informal economy in Delhi, India.   
1.1 Background 
1.1.i Belonging in a global city: the case of the migrant Muslim 
informal worker 
The 2006 Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India 
(SCR) presents a comprehensive image of the overall negative social status of 
Muslims in India related to issues of identity, security and equity (Ibid.11). A 
division of the population of India according to poverty status reveals that 
‘79% of the informal or unorganised workers [in India]…and 84% of the 
Muslims belong to the poor and vulnerable group’ (ARC, 2007:8). 
Commenting on the image of the (economically) ‘shining India’, the ARC 
points out that this has only been limited to the middle classes whereas the 
‘poor and vulnerable’ section of the population, accounting for about 77% of 
the total population of India (Sengupta, et al. 2008: 52), ‘have remained poor at 
a bare subsistence level without any job or social security, working in the most 
                                                
1 I want to thank my supervisors Amrita and Karin; my respondents in Delhi; and 
Linus: without whom this research would not have been possible or as enjoyable. 
2 Many researchers have held up the Act as ineffective. E.g. Goswami, (2009) 
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miserable, unhygienic and unliveable conditions, throughout this period of 
high economic growth since the early nineties’ (ARC, 2007: 8). 
A disproportionately large number of Muslims in India work in the 
informal economy as self-employed and ‘their participation in formal sector 
employment is significantly less than the national average’ (SCR, 2006: 95). 
Harris-White and Aseem Prakash (n.d) delineate a ‘regime of social 
discrimination in India [whereby the country’s] norms of social order support 
the capacity of the “dominant” social groups to act against and police 
[economic and other] interests of social groups constituting the 
D[alits,]A[divasis and ]M[uslims]’. Such exclusionary practices, both in the 
formal and informal economies, have been well documented (e.g. Thorat and 
Attewell, 2007; Prasad-Aleyamma, 2011). Social exclusion as normalised, 
everyday practices of citizens belonging to the dominant (Hindu, upper caste) 
groups is fairly visible. An example would be the widespread practice of Hindu 
landlords refusing to rent or sell their properties to Muslim tenants (Hashmi, 
2009; Bawa, 2009; Menon, 2012; Ashok and Ali, 2012).  
Rural to urban migration attracts a large number of migrants (circular and 
permanent) to Delhi (ARC, 2007). However, there are also transnational 
migrants—illegal/undocumented3, as well as refugees and asylum seekers4 in 
Delhi. The issue of Muslim immigrants/refugees has been a difficult topic in 
India. Ashish Bose (2004:4698) points out that ‘[e]ven the term “refugee” is 
not without controversies. In some circles, Hindu migrants from Bangladesh 
are called refugees, while Muslim migrants are called “infiltrators” and illegal 
migrants’. Bose also points out that determining who is an ‘economic migrant’ 
is often marked by existing structures of power. 
Are Americans seeking jobs in the IT sector in Bangalore and Hyderabad 
economic refugees? Are they not driven from home primarily by the high 
unemployment rate and bleak economic prospects in US? (Ibid.) 
Following Bose, I would like to argue that asylum seekers/refugees/economic 
migrants cannot be seen as rigidly differentiated categories, particularly in the 
context of Delhi—economic imperatives are as important for Muslim migrants 
from eastern states of India as they are for immigrants and refugees in Delhi. 
Moving to locations where imperatives of the globalised market economy 
result in a concentration of economic opportunities (Sassen, 2001; 2002) is the 
underlying logic for both internal migration as well as international 
immigration, even if there are other reasons for migrating  which are not purely 
economic (see section 4.1.ii).  
                                                
3 The Bangladeshi/Bengali Muslims are the most prominently labelled as such, 
particularly in the context of Delhi. E.g. Ramachandran, 1999; 2003 
4 Among these the Afghans are the most numerous (UNHCR Global Appeal -India 
2011) but this is the second wave of Afghans seeking refuge in Delhi the first wave 
being around the 1980s during and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There are 
also asylum seekers from other West Asian countries like Iran  and Iraq, African 
countries like Somalia and Asian countries like Myanmar (personal interviews, 
UNHCR).  
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Sassen (2002:185), writing about international labour migration to the 
global cities of the North writes: 
[G]lobal cities have become places where large numbers of low-paid women and 
immigrants get incorporated into strategic economic sectors. Some are incorporated 
directly as low wage clerical and service workers such as janitors and repairmen. For 
others, the process is less direct, operating instead through the consumption practices of 
high income professionals who employ maids and nannies and who patronize expensive 
restaurants and shops staffed by low-wage workers 
However, global cities are not only a feature of the economies of the global 
North as critics have pointed out: cities of the South are embedded in the 
global economy and often also aspire to the tag of ‘global-city’ (Gugler, 2004; 
Dupont, 2011). Dupont (2011) writes about the ‘ambition to develop Delhi as 
a global city’ as ‘rooted in the liberalization reforms of the 1990s’ (Ibid: 550). 
The world-city tag adopted by Delhi is stridently proclaimed through 
documents such as the Delhi Master Plan 2021 (MPD-2021, Appendix II). 
Delhi has socio-spatial fragmentations marked on its geography by the fact of 
its being ‘continuously settled for about 2500 years’ (Kudva, 2006:169). The 
particularities of these fractures in the modern Delhi can be traced back, partly 
to the colonial efforts of segregation—separating the white, modern, New 
Delhi from the old, Mughal city of Shahajanabad /Old Delhi—and continued 
under the Delhi Development Authority’s (DDA) mandate in the independent 
capital (Dupont, 2004, map 1). Today, Delhi is ‘India’s capital and showcase 
city’ (Kudva, 2006: 170). However, ‘[t]his drive for global competitiveness 
involving image building has had negative consequences, especially for the 
poor, through “cleansing” the city of slums and other alleged undesirable 
elements’ (Dupont, 2011: 533). 
Empirical studies in Delhi on migrant labourers in the informal economy 
reveal quite a grim picture (Bhan, 2009; Kudva, 2006; Baviskar, 2003; 2006). 
The anxieties about belonging in Delhi became more and more apparent with 
its explicit claims to a world-class city status around the Commonwealth 
Games (Dupont 2011). Around the CWG in 2010, the issues of the right to the 
‘millennial city’ (Bhan, 2009), came to more focussed attention when the drive 
to spruce up the city’s image resulted in a mass eviction and invisibilisation 
drive which included slum demolitions and arresting ‘beggars’, among other 
things (Zee News, 2010; Indian Express, 2009; Indian Express, 2010; The 
Hindu, 2010). These drives, conversely highlighted the plight of those 
‘labouring at the margins of citizenship’ (Dalmia, 2009), in mainstream media 
within India (Tehelka, 2010) as well as outside (BBC, 2010).  
Researchers have further pointed out that the harassment of migrants in 
Delhi are coloured by ethnic and religious overtones.  Baviskar (2006) points 
out that the focus of the state’s exclusionary practices is directed at particular 
ethno-regional groups such as the Muslim migrants from the poorer eastern 
states of Bihar and Bengal. Corroborating Ramachandran’s (1999, 2003) 
research, Baviskar writes that ‘the spectre of Muslim terrorist infiltrators from 
Bangladesh has become a potent weapon to harass Bengali-speaking Muslim 
migrants in the city’ (Baviskar, 2006: 4).  
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MAP 1 
 Map of Delhi showing squatter settlements, resettlement colonies,  
the old city and the new city 
 
Source: Dupont, 2004. 
 
Being a Muslim, and a migrant engaged in the informal economy thus, seems 
to create multiple intersections of oppression. Looking at the empirical works 
cited above, the Muslim migrant in informal economy, emerges as oppressed 
through enmeshed social, political, legal and economic structures. The migrant 
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Muslim informal worker seems marginalised and invisibilised and left without 
any entitlements in the context of the global city.  
However, this notion of utter disempowerment and victimization has been 
challenged in theories as well as ethnographies. Ramachandran, (1999) uses 
Scott’s (1985) work—which problematizes ‘intention’ in ‘resistance’—in her 
ethnography of ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ in Delhi. Her ethnography reveals 
how Bengali/Bangladeshi Muslim migrants lay strategic claims to complex 
identities in which subordination and resistance play equal parts in challenging 
‘depictions of Muslims…as passive, helpless victims of Hindutva's exclusionary 
processes, lacking initiative and agency’ (Ramachandran, 1999: 240). Thus, 
Muslim migrants emerge as more than just ‘victims’ of structural oppression. I 
explore the theories that critically look at empowerment/authority/agency in 
Chapter 2. In the next section, I look at gender as an important location of 
identity. 
1.1.ii Gender as an important locus of identity: Muslim men and 
hegemonic masculinity in India 
Joan Scott (1988) defines gender as a social relation which is the primary way 
of signifying relationships of power. As an analytic concept, it allows ‘an 
exploration of gendered inequalities but also provides the possibility of using 
gender to theorize the concept of inequality’ (Roy, 2003:19). Women have long 
been regarded as the ultimate underclass, marginalized doubly by their gender 
as well as by the socio-economic structures, particularly in academic literature 
pertaining to informal economy (e.g. Harriss-White 2002, 2009; Mezzadri, 
2008). However, I would like to critically examine the easy equation of 
patriarchy and capital accumulation (Ibid.; Sassen, 2002), thereby 
problematizing the ‘functionalism of capitalism and patriarchy endlessly aiding 
and abetting each other’ (Roy, 2003:19).  
In my research I have chosen to focus on migrant Muslim men in the 
informal economy and I look at how the intersections of class and ethnicity 
with their gendered subjectivity impact their self-constructions as working 
men. Further, in exploring ‘gendered inequalities’ I am looking at the 
hierarchies of masculinities and how these inequalities are constructed among 
the seemingly homogenous gender category of ‘men’. Masculinities structure 
not only the relationships among men and women but also those between men 
(Sinha, 1999:446).  
In the dominant social script of the Hindu right in India, the Muslim man 
is constructed as the aggressor, outsider, invader, ‘dangerously virile’ (Anand, 
2007: 260)—a construction in which the history of past Muslim rule in the 
Indian subcontinent figures prominently. The Hindu right wing masculinity is 
constructed as the hegemonic formulation of masculinity (Bharucha, 1995) by 
othering a stereotypical Muslim masculinity. The stereotyped image of the 
Muslim aggressor, then, becomes the foil for the ‘anxious’ Hindu masculinity 
(Anand, 2007). The construction of a right-wing, hegemonic, Hindu 
masculinity aims to vindicate the past effeteness of Hindu men who were 
defeated by Muslim ruler-invaders by defending the nation (defined as the 
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mother goddess). Violent communal massacres—such as those perpetrated by 
the Hindu right in 2002 in Gujarat—particularly on the bodies of Muslim 
women, read through this lens of hierarchized masculinities, become a way to 
emasculate the Muslim men (Ibid. 264). Thus, the pernicious power of images 
such as that of the insidious Bangladeshi infiltrator-terrorist (Ramachandran, 
1999; 2003) stems from the construction of a subordinate Muslim masculinity 
which is also dangerous. The associations which go hand-in-hand with being 
identified as a Muslim man, therefore, necessarily affect their entitlements as 
citizens. 
1.2 Research question and objective 
How do multiple identities affect the entitlements (as citizens) of Muslim male migrants 
working in the informal economy in Delhi? 
Through the primary data collected in course of interviews conducted in 
Delhi, this research proposes to look at how homogenized categories of 
identity, as implied by ‘Muslim male migrant’, are fractured by multiple 
allegiances. The research aims to reclaim the one dimensional ‘victim’ Muslim 
migrant as a complex subject with agentic capacities. It further aims to 
establish that identity—through its inherent fluidity and multiplicity—itself 
becomes a site through which agency is asserted.  
1.3 Relevance 
While systemic marginalisation of Muslims, migrants and informal labourers is 
very much a reality, it is also important not to homogenise this vast group of 
workers and entrepreneurs. Moreover, labelling the socially marginalised as 
‘victims’ further devalues their capacity for action. Therefore, this research tries 
to reclaim a complex subjectivity for the Muslim migrants in informal 
economy. By studying the hierarchy of masculinities as power relations that 
structure inequalities between men in informal economy, this study addresses a 
gap in the literature.  
In the context of Delhi, it is necessary to reformulate the concept ‘citizen’ 
and the entitlements stemming from citizenship, in view of the skewed 
developmental vision. However, in doing so it is important to look at Muslim 
male migrants as complex subjects with capacity to act, to resist and to 
articulate their aspirations. This research tries to challenge the developmental 
policies in the city from the multiple positions that Muslim migrants in the city 
actually articulate rather than reducing them to a voiceless mass of victims 
1.4 Structure of the research paper 
Chapter 2 of this paper goes on to examine some of the main theoretical 
underpinnings of the research. By exploring the conceptualisations of ‘agency’, 
‘citizenship’, ‘identity’ and so on, the chapter undergirds the analysis (Chapter 
4). Chapter 3 looks at the methodology of the research from the selection of 
techniques, to the actual implications of applying these methods in the field. 
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The chapter, particularly Section 3.4, reflects on the power imbalances that 
necessarily figures in any researcher-respondent interaction and tries to situate 
the knowledge claims within this matrix of power relations. Chapter 4 critically 
looks at identities by analysing the narratives of respondents through the 
concepts elaborated in Chapter 2. It ends with (Section 4.4) an attempt to 
locate how entitlements figure in these narratives leading to the more detailed 
analysis of the entitlements in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 summarises the paper and 
then goes onto look at entitlements of citizens and its policy implications in 
Delhi. The Chapter concludes with a critical look at the Right to the City 
(RTTC) discourse and how it can be interpreted in more dynamic ways to 
create a more inclusive vision of development in the context of Indian 
metropolises.   
2   Theoretical framework 
The following subsections critically explore the concepts already mentioned in 
Chapter 1. These form the basis of the analysis of the primary data in Chapter 
4. The analytical framework in this chapter tries to address the ways in which 
‘identity’ can be conceptualised. The conceptualisation of ‘agency’ and 
‘citizenship’ help in examining the complex and multiple identities through 
which entitlements are claimed78. 
2.1 Ethnicity and capital in the informal economy 
Following Nagel (2000:112) , we can define ethnicity ‘as a series of 
crisscrossing boundaries dividing populations into multiple groups 
differentiated by religion, colour, language, culture, and…these boundaries are 
changeable and permeable’ which helps us move beyond ‘primordialist, 
essentialist understandings of ethnicity…as biological…or as historically or 
culturally determined’ (Ibid.) . Use of the term ‘ethnicity’ in India refers to the 
regional, religious, linguistic and caste differences, rather than racial ones. 
In the Indian context, Harriss-White (2002) writes, informal economy 
cannot be successfully disentagled from social institutions such as ethnicity and 
gender. The hierarchies of social institutions are reflected in the hierarchies of 
class so that those at the top—upper caste Hindu males—exploit those at the 
bottom—Muslim/Dalit/Adivasi females. Informality then becomes 
characterised by this hierarchy with those at the top accumulating capital at the 
expense of those at the bottom (Ibid.; Harris-White and Prakash, n.d).  
To broaden this narrowly economic approach to informality it is 
important to look at the forms of capital Bourdieu (1986) outlined. Linking the 
‘material and the symbolic’ (Siegmann, 2010: 348) Bourdieu’s conception looks 
at how “in a particular social field structured by relations of domination, 
subordination or homology…the capitals an individual is endowed with 
represent sources of power and hence influence individuals’ opportunities and 
well-being” (Ibid.). Bourdieu identifies economic, social, cultural and symbolic 
capital encompassing both the material and the symbolic.  
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Economic capital can be ‘institutionalised in the forms of property rights’ 
(Ibid.: 348) whereas social capital is the ‘aggregate of resources linked’ (Ibid.)to 
being part of a social network. Cultural capital in the embodied state consists 
of ‘long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body’ (Bourdieau, 1986: 47), the 
objectified state as ‘cultural goods’ (Ibid.) and in the institutional state as 
educational qualifications. Finally symbolic capital ‘in the form of honour and 
prestige is the recognition and legitimisation of other kinds of capital’ 
(Siegmann, 2010: 349). All other forms of capital can be converted into 
economic capital although for Bourdieu the most important is the 
‘accumulation of symbolic capital’ (Ibid.). Thus, class becomes dependent not 
just on material possessions, but also symbolic accumulations. 
The phenomenon of ‘ethnic economy’ has become increasingly talked 
about, particularly in context of the immigrants in first world countries. ‘Ethnic 
economy’ or, sometimes ‘ethnic enclave economy’ is often defined as the 
‘immigrant owned business sector in which immigrant work as employees of 
co-ethnics or as entrepreneurs’(Light, et al 1994: 65) although whether this 
benefits or exploits the participants is a matter of debate (Model, 1992: 63). 
However, other researchers have questioned the whole concept.  The 
application of the term ‘ethnic’ in the context of countries of the North with 
large immigrant populations, Pieterse (2000:4) points out expresses a 
relationship of power: 
Ethnicity is a marker of cultural distance but not every culture qualifies. A 
country’s or a people’s location in the hierarchy of power also matters. 
Therefore, a native American handicrafts shop or an Ethiopian restaurant is 
characterised as ethnic whereas a pizzeria might be considered more 
mainstream American. Pieterse (Ibid.) recommends replacing ‘ethnic economy’ 
with immigrant or migrant economy. 
While there is some truth, in claims that subordinates in the ethnic (and 
gender) hierarchy occupy lower rungs of class position (Harris-White, 2002), it 
is important to note that ethnicity in and of itself cannot be reified as class. 
The informal economy is segmented into various labour status positions. 
Migrants from the same ethnicity do not necessarily occupy the same labour 
status as for instance in the case that one migrant might work (waged informal 
worker/unpaid family worker) in an enterprise owned by a fellow migrant of 
the same ethnicity (employer).  
This research looks at those migrants who are working within the self-
employed segment of the informal economy. ‘Self-employed’ is a broad and 
‘fuzzy’ (ARC, 2007) category and including wide differences in class (Ibid.). 
There are further subdivisions within this category distinguishing the 
employers (hiring at least one worker, paid or family based) and own account 
workers (ARC, and Fig.1).  
In Chapter 4, I will be using these concepts to look at how self-employed male 
migrants in the urban informal economy access and mobilise the different 
forms of capital through the use of multiple identities, including their ethnic 
identity. 
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FIGURE 1 
 Workers and enterprises in the informal economy 
 
 
Source: ARC 
 
2.2 Agency 
Agency has been conceptualised within liberal academic traditions as 
individualistic and emancipatory. Marxist theories of agency gives us the 
concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘false consciousness’ used to explain how 
individuals can legitimise their own oppression through their belief systems. 
Feminist theorists have been particularly engaged with theories of agency and 
subordination. Mahmood (2001: 205) points out that feminist scholarship 
abandoned the overly simplistic ‘false consciousness’ argument and moved 
towards an understanding of the ‘operation of human agency within structures 
of subordination’ (Ibid.). A proponent of such an enmeshed view of agency 
comes from  Schneider (1993). She writes about the problems of looking at 
agency as ‘based on notions of individual choice and responsibility, individual 
will and action: perceptions of a world composed of atomized individuals, 
acting alone, unconstrained by social forces, unmediated by social structures 
and systemic hardship’ (Ibid. 395-396) and the false dichotomy between 
victimization and agency emerging from such notions.  
Ethnographies of subordinated social groups in the informal economy, 
particularly that of James Scott (1985) and Jan Breman (1996), similarly 
problematise victimization by showing that even the most marginalised are 
capable of resisting subordination. Breman writes that circulation itself is an act 
of protest fuelled by a ‘desire to keep one’s dignity intact’ (Ibid. 255). However, 
Breman reads the migrants’ docility and reservedness as only one side of the 
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coin which is complimented by violent behaviour on those who are ‘even more 
vulnerable, particularly women and children’ (Ibid. 256).  
While acknowledging the truth of what Breman writes, I would here 
extend Mahmood’s (2001) critique of such conceptions which envision 
conscious or unconscious resistance as the only way to exert agency. Mahmood 
(2001) envisions a ‘docile subject’ whose agentic capacities are premised upon 
submission, particularly embodied submission. Mahmood, thus, broadens the 
scope of agency to ‘capacity for action’ and not just resistance to or desire to 
resist dominance (Chakraborty, 2012). 
I do not think that the ideas of resistance to dominant structures and 
submission to the same are necessarily opposed. Instead in my analysis I use 
both to show how resistance and submission both form parts of the migrants’ 
multiple identities.  
2.3 Identity/identities 
I find that I am constantly being encouraged to pluck out some one aspect of myself and present 
this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying the other parts of self ~Audre Lorde  
(Lorde 1984: 108)   
Lorde’s words bring up a problem that has plagued feminists and feminism. 
Identities of solidarity—as in the unified construct of ‘woman’— have often 
erased differences and internal complexities (such as white versus black 
women). Post-structuralism has broadened the conception of identity by 
helping us envision the multiplicity, fluidity and fragmentary nature of 
identities (Chhachhi and Pittin, 1995). Encapsulating this in their definition, 
Chhachhi and Pittin (Ibid. 6) write: 
Identities refer to subject positions which are made available and mobilized in 
specific historical contexts. Identities are selectively mobilized in response to 
economic, social, political and cultural processes [and] therefore, may be 
constantly shifting, not only historically, but also at a given point of time. 
Identities involve the interplay of [factors such as] class, gender, caste, race, 
ethnicity, and age…  
Thus, a person may inhabit multiple identities and the adoption of different 
identities, mobilised in response to different contexts, reflects the agentic 
capacity of the subject.  
Elaborating, further on the concept of identity, Chhachhi (1991) writes on 
‘forced identity’ distinguishing it from identities of affinity. Forced identities 
are identities that are imposed on an individual—an external imposition loaded 
with signifiers such as the stereotypical image of the Muslim man as the 
aggressor (see: Section1.1.ii). However, Chhachhi (1991) shows by analysing 
cases from India, forced identities can also be strategically embraced to harness 
its perceived benefits in a context.  
Identities of affinity are, on the hand, are those that an individual deploys 
at various moments, consciously or otherwise, foregrounding one or the other 
of her multiple allegiances. Writing in context of the multiple allegiances of 
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immigrant Muslim individuals in Britain, Hussain and Bagguley (2005:408) 
point out that identities are necessarily fluid in a world where individuals have 
multiple allegiances. I will attempt to show in my analysis that fluid identities 
can be used to legitimise access to certain entitlements. 
2.4 Masculinity and power 
Masculinity ‘traverses multiples axes of race, caste, class, sexuality, religion, and 
ethnicity [and] cannot be confined solely within its supposedly “proper” 
domain of male-female relations’ (Sinha, 1999:446). Sinha (1995, 1999) 
examines Indian masculinity in its historical colonial contexts to reveal how 
masculinities are ‘more fundamentally about relations of power’ (1999:449) and 
cannot be seen only as relational to femininity.  
To understand how hierarchies of masculinities work within India it is 
important to take a look at colonial legacies. Sinha(1999:448) writes that the 
British colonial ‘cult of manliness and masculinity’ (Ibid: 446) reshaped the 
gendered relation between men of different ethnicities in India. The ‘colonialist 
ethnography’ which classified different ethnicities/regional groups into martial 
and non-martial races was to have profound impact upon the hierarchies of 
masculinity upto the present time (Ibid.:447). The stereotypes of the ‘manly’ 
Punjabi and the ‘effeminate’ Bengali, still holds today. And stereotypes based 
on religion like virile Muslim and effete Hindus have wider repercussions 
today, particularly in view of the rise of right wing Hindu nationalism.  
In the Indian context today, the hypermasculinist Hindutva ideology is 
constructed in relation to the ‘Other’—the Muslim men (Chopra et al. 2004: 4) 
and reflects the hierarchical relations of power between men as has been 
elaborated already in Section 1.1.ii.   
Connell’s (2005) classification of masculinities in their hierarchical 
relations to each other, namely: hegemonic, subordinate, complicit and 
marginilized forms of masculinities tries to overcome the challenge of 
essentialising ‘a working class masculinity’ or ‘a black masculinity’ (Ibid:76) 
when acknowledging multiple masculinities.  
However, the messy realities are not necessarily bound by such neat 
classifications and power is not just a top-down structure. In my primary 
research I found various categories of masculinist subject positions that occupy 
different power structures at different moments and do not remain confined to 
any category as such. My analyses will attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of 
these categories as well as where messy reality overtakes and reshapes the 
theory.  
Connell’s theory, moreover, is developed in the west (Chopra, et al, 2004: 
1). For instance, Connel looks at the subordinate masculinity within the 
western framework of homosexuality and heteronormativity and marginalised 
masculinity within relations of race and class. In the Indian context, however 
religion and ethnic structures blend the subordinate and marginalised 
masculinities in many cases, as I will attempt to demonstrate in my analysis 
(Section 4.3). 
18 
 
In my research I’m looking at men working in the informal economy who 
are, indeed, more visible than women and yet their gendered identities cannot 
be captured simply by ‘the analytically crude cardboard cutouts of pampered 
sons and patriarchs’ (Roy, 2003: 20). As Jackson (2001:7) posits, 
‘[c]onventional class analysis has a lot to say about relations between men but 
often as universal ungendered subjects’. The understanding of how men with 
marginalised identity (because of ethnic, migratory and livelihood-related 
locations) negotiate hegemonic masculinity and power hierarchies in their 
relations with other men is important, particularly in the field of South Asian 
masculinities (Chopra et al, 2004:5). In my analysis I will try to nuance the 
image of the one-dimensional patriarchs through the performances of 
masculinities that I encountered in the field.  
2.5 Entitlements and the Right to the City 
A person’s entitlements in a city can be defined under the category of urban 
citizenship which must be distinguished from the concept of a citizen in the 
legal sense of an individual defined by rights and duties in relation to the nation 
(Dupont et al, 2011:4). Urban citizenship is about ‘legitimacy’ (Ibid.)’ or 
‘belonging’ (Bhan, 2009) and can be defined as ‘a very fluid, but not porous 
boundary between those people whose presence is legitimate in the city and 
others’ (Dupont et al. 2011: 4). 
 
In context of Delhi, legitimacy as a citizen is severely curtailed (see: 
Section 1.1.i) for many residents of the city as Gautam Bhan (2009:141) writes: 
[A] particular set of values – hygiene, environment, progress and growth-centric 
government, market participation, planning and order, aesthetics, notions of a 
‘world class city’ and leisure...It is these ‘sensibilities’ that increasingly define the 
right to the city and urban citizenship in contemporary Indian cities, and they are, 
I suggest, representative of a new ideal citizen-subject in the making: an 
aspirational middle-class consumer citizen, ideally primed to live in a ‘world class 
city’. 
Looking back at Sassen’s (2002:185) writing about migrants in global-cities, we 
can see that the rights of these delegitimised labourers in the arena of 
work/occupation is also eroded: 
. Traditionally, employment in growth sectors has been a source of workers’ 
empowerment; this new pattern undermines that linkage, producing a class of 
workers who are isolated, dispersed and effectively invisible 
To understand this phenomena, caused by the imperatives globalised market 
economy, Standing (2009, 2011, 2012) has coined the term ‘precariat’—a new 
class which lacks an occupational community like the traditional proletariat and 
is, therefore, much more fragmented (Ibid. 2012:1). Internally heterogeneous, 
the precariat, ‘a class in the making’, consists of ‘millions with insecure jobs, 
housing and social entitlements’ (Ibid.). ‘Migrants make up a large share of the 
world’s precariat. They are…in danger of becoming…demonised and made the 
scapegoat of problems not of their making’ (Standing, 2011:90). 
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In order to define the kinds of rights and entitlements that the precariat 
can and cannot claim, Standing (2011:94) uses the term denizen—someone 
who has less rights—and therefore, less legitimacy—than a citizen.  
Combining the concept of urban citizenship and envisioning the 
delegitimised in the urban spaces as ‘denizens’ gives a frame through which to 
look at the Muslim migrant men in Delhi and their experiences of 
discriminations (Section 1.1.i). In this context, to challenge the marginalisations 
and claim entitlement, the concept of the right to the city (RTTC) seems 
suitable.  
In the Lefebvrian origins of the concept, RTTC is a common right as 
opposed to an individual right to property (Roy, 2005:155). In both Lefebvre’s 
vision and Harvey’s (2008) expansion of that, RTTC emerges as a critique of 
the imperatives of global capitalism in its manifestations through the processes 
of urbanization today. Harvey (2008: 39) writes: 
[T]he metropolis is now the point of massive collision...over the accumulation by 
dispossession….and the developmental drive that seeks to colonize space for the 
affluent 
Dupont et. al (2011:2) points out a second use of the concept in the way in 
which it is used by social movements as ‘a bundle of rights that can be 
obtained only by engaging with the institutions of the developmental state’. In 
its current formulations the UNESCO/UN-HABITAT, however, relegates 
RTTC beyond the realm of positive, juridical rights and into that of the moral 
(Baxi, 2011:17). 
In Chapter 5 I will use RTTC to critically look at the vision of development as 
adopted in the MPD-2021 and examine implications it has on the entitlements 
of the Muslim migrant men in Delhi.  
 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have tried to outline a broad framework looking at the 
theories of agency and identity—particularly from a post-structuralist 
understanding—as well as urban citizenship and entitlements, keeping in mind 
that within the informal economy categories such as class, ethnicity and capital 
take on different contextual meanings.  
3  Methodology 
This chapter deals with the experiences in conducting fieldwork as well as the 
choices and strategies and dilemmas. The sample size was bigger but I chose to 
focus on two groups of Muslim migrants in south Delhi—the restau-rant 
owners of Afghan origin and Bengali speaking rickshaw-pullers—for the 
analysis. 
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3.1 Data generation techniques 
[Q]uestions of politics and epistemologies of location have become increasingly central to...social 
science research...[C]lose connections between personal and representational process has framed 
feminist research ~Bolak (1996: 107-108) 
The topic of enquiry in my research, namely, multiple narratives of identity, is 
something that has been a recurrent theme in feminist research. The 
conception of identity as a multi-locational site which is always in flux 
(Chapter2) necessitates the acknowledgement of the researcher’s presence into 
the narratives she creates. The ‘epistemologies of location’ as Bolak (1996), 
puts it are important in understanding the narratives of identity. Feminist 
researchers like Bolak (Ibid.) and Henry (2007) reflect on their methodology 
through a mode of constructive self-critique which has come to be defined as 
an important part of feminist research methods (Ackerly and True, 2010: 53). I 
felt that qualitative methodology, with feminist accentuation of situated, 
subjective knowledge, is suited for my purposes. My situatedness in the context 
(Section 3.2) was an important part of my decision to undertake this research. 
I migrated to Delhi, for work, from my home city of Kolkata in 2009. I 
was living away from family, friends and a familiar city for the first time in my 
life. The experience of dislocation from the familiar helped me empathise with 
the other migrants. The migrants that I met in my daily interactions, living (and 
working) in a colony in South Delhi5 mostly comprised rickshaw-pullers, auto 
drivers and shopkeepers (including restaurant owners). This was further 
nuanced by my work in an NGO which was doing research on migrants in the 
informal economy. In a Delhi famous for its righteous middle class indignation 
about rude ‘autowallahs’6(Bhan, 2012)  and the menace of other poor migrants 
(Baviskar, 2006) I found myself chatting with migrants, some of whom even 
spoke in a familiar tongue7. The interactions were not always smooth—there 
was awkwardness, even hostility sometimes. I was often very aware of the 
differences in class positions. The conversations either happened over an 
economic transaction in which I was on the paying side, or in my capacity as a 
researcher employed by an NGO, visiting squatter settlements. In a city in 
which the ‘middle-class consumer citizen’ (Bhan, 2009) is increasingly the only 
legitimate mode of belonging, these interactions, in and by themselves, were 
my ways of challenging the dominant script. This research paper is part of the 
same processes—my attempt at locating myself in a melange of cross cutting 
identities and allegiances that is Delhi.   
                                                
5 Researchers (Dupont, 2004; Datta, 2011) have long commented on the variegated 
socio-spatial organisation of Delhi describing it variously as a ‘mongrel city’ (Dutta, 
2011:752), ‘a city without spatial continuity’ (Dupont, 2004: 158) and so on. The south 
has been primarily envisioned as a middle class area with government colonies and 
resettlement colonies constructed since the early fifties through and in the Master 
Plans of the Delhi Development Authority(Ibid.). 
6 Auto drivers  
7 Dialects of Bengali, my mother tongue, vary regionally but are also marked by one’s 
class. See also section 4.1.i, particularly footnote 24.  
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The methdological approach I selected needed to incorporate and help me 
to reflect on my positionality. My familiarity with feminist methodologies 
which emphasize the personal and the reflexive was instrumental in helping me 
choose qualitative methodologies over quantitative ones. The recognition that 
“how we represent and account for others’ experiences is intimately related to 
who we are” (Bolak, 1996:108) in feminist epistemologies makes it necessary to 
underscore the process of knowledge creation.  
In course of conducting the research, I knew that my subject positions 
and perceived identities would intersect with those of the respondents’ creating 
narratives that were riddled with intersections of the different identities. 
Crenshaw (1991) uses intersectionality to map the complex interconnections 
between gender and other structures of identity. However, I feel that my 
methodological approach benefits from Feree’s (2011) understanding of 
‘interactive intersectionality’ as an ‘on-going historical process’ as it looks at 
identities as processes made and remade through intersections in which 
structure and agency, institutions and individuals are all enmeshed. (Ibid: 56)  
I used semi-structured interviews as a method of data generation that was 
both flexible but at the same time, allowed ‘guided focus’ (Ackerly and True, 
2010: 168). In pointing to the merits of semi-structured interviews, Ackerly and 
True (Ibid.) point out that being more like conversation, semi-structured 
interviews allow the respondent ‘to give answers that do not conform to the 
researcher’s (known or unknown) expectations’. It therefore becomes a more 
equal way of co-producing data (Ibid. 169) with the respondents thereby 
further problematizing positivist claims. Further, I also decided to use the 
ethnographic tool of participant observation. As a person already embedded in 
the context, this seemed a way to deepen my understanding outside interviews. 
Section 3.2 demonstrates how issues of accessibility made pre constructed 
ideas about conducting interviews problematic through the exigencies of the 
field. The flexibility and processional nature of feminist methodology helped 
me in my strategic and ad hoc application of methodological tools.  
3.2 Selection of location and respondents 
I decided to focus primarily on the Lajpat Nagar-Bhogal (LNB) area with the 
ubiquitous rickshaw-pullers and the fast multiplying Afghan eateries. However, 
my analysis is also informed by some interviews conducted in Khirki and 
everyday lived experiences in Shahpur Jat where I stayed in course of my three 
months long field visit. The choice of the locations mentioned above were 
certainly influenced by concerns of feasibility, accessibility and above all 
familiarity. In LNB, Afghan businesses and Bengali rickshaw-pullers are 
prominently visible and part of the daily lives of non-Afghan and non-Bengali 
residents of and commuters to8 the area. I did not have a mediating gatekeeper 
in the form of an NGO or a person for n introduction into the field. 
Therefore, it was very important to be able to have access to my respondents 
                                                
8 Lajpat Nagar is home to one of the most popular markets in South Delhi—a mix of 
street vendors and established shops. 
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as a matter of course. The visibility of the rickshaw-pullers and restaurant 
owners in an informal setting that was not hidden or underground was the 
perfect field setting in which to direct my enquiries.  
Both LNB and Khirki are also locations where I have lived in my two 
years in Delhi and so I already had a degree of familiarity with them which 
made it easier for me to conduct interviews. For instance, knowing where the 
rickshaw stands or the restaurants were located, helped me in conducting 
interviews as well as making observations.  
TABLE 1 
 Groups of respondents and sample size 
Ethnicity;  
Location 
of work; 
Numbers 
Occupation Numbers 
used in 
analysis 
Mode  
of  
interview 
Mode  
of  
recording 
Number  
of 
 interviews per 
person 
Location  
of 
 interview 
Legal 
citizenship 
status 
Afghans  
from 
Khirki: 6 
Unemployed, 
unpaid 
careworker, 
employed at 
UNHCR 
livelihood 
centre 
2 
(Anwar and 
his wife) 
Semi structured in 
group and 
individually.  
Manually during 
interviews, 
digitally (with 
Anwar) 
Thrice with 
Anwar, once 
with the others 
Home of Anwar, 
neutral public 
space 
(shopping mall) 
Refugee card 
holders 
Afghans  
from  
LNB; 6 
Restaurant 
owner/co-
owner, 
Bakery 
owner, 
Students 
working at 
bakery 
4 
(Afzal, Asif, 
Tariq and 
Abid) 
Semi structured,  
Semi structured by 
prior appointment 
(Afzal)+ Participant 
observation 
Digitally (Afzal) 
and manually 
during 
interviewing 
Twice (with 
Abid) once with 
the rest 
Restaurants and 
bakery, in most 
cases after 
eating there 
Refugee card 
holder ( 3), 
Under RSD (1), 
Indian citizen 
(1), Afghan 
national with 
IndianBuisness 
Visa(1) 
Bengalis   
from  LNB 
: 10+ 
Rickshaw 
drivers (see 
section 4.2)  
2  
(Jhagru, 
Mazar and 
respondents 
in group 
interview) 
and minor 
findings 
from a large 
number of 
participants 
Semi structured 
individual, semi-
structured group, 
informal+participant 
observations 
Manually during 
interviewing, 
digitally (group 
interview) and 
writing from 
memory 
(informal 
interviews) 
Multiple with 
those living in 
Lajpat Nagar, 
Single with 
those living in 
Nizamuddin/Kale 
Khan 
During rickshaw 
rides (informal 
interviews) at 
rickshaw 
stands, at a tea 
stall (group 
interview) 
Legal citizen 
with Aadhar 
cards (issued 
by Delhi 
government), 
Voters id cards 
(issued at 
village of 
origin) and no 
documents 
Others : 3 Hindu 
neighbor, 
(Hindu) 
Activist-
Lawyer: 
Samira, 
(Hindu) 
Grocery 
Store Owner 
3 Informal 
conversation, Semi 
structured interview 
(Samira) 
Writing from 
memory(informal 
interviews) and  
manually during 
interviewing   
Single and 
Multiple (Samira) 
Residential 
neighbourhoods 
of LNB and 
Samira’s office 
(presumed) 
Legal citizens  
The selection of respondents was primarily based on accessibility. Lacking a 
gate-keeper—and failing to acquire one even when access became nearly 
impossible—my only mode of eliciting responses became approaching the 
respondents at their locations of work directly and hoping that it would lead to 
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snowballing. In case of the Bengali speaking respondents, as I had anticipated, 
I was able to use my ‘authentic’ (Henry, 2007) identity as a fellow-native and 
migrant to Delhi with varying degrees of success, although issues of trust (see 
section 3.4) complicated the actual mode of interviewing and recording data. 
But snowball sampling (Ackerly and True, 2010: 157) became more or less 
successful with respondents voluntarily introducing me to others who were 
from the same village. 
With Afghans on the other hand, being othered on every possible location 
of identity—as female, local (as opposed to being migrant), 
young/untrustworthy—the tactic of approaching did not work. In course of 
trying to access respondents, I ended up interviewing an activist-lawyer from a 
refugee rights NGO as well as some (more) willing Afghan refugees in Khirki, 
a second location where Afghan immigrants in south Delhi live in moderate 
numbers. However, I failed to interview any Afghans from Lajpat Nagar till I 
started making strategic use of a male co-researcher. With him I was able to 
access to restaurant owners in course of their daily work in an ad-hoc fashion. 
The table below shows the number of respondents, the methods of 
interviewing them and the use of narratives thus collected in the analysis. 
3.3 Techniques for data analysis 
In looking for narratives of identity in fragmentary conversations (created 
through the ad hoc and messy interview process) I created tables and mind-
maps to identify the main issues at stake, in my case—the different kinds of 
identities in each group, the interplay among these competing/complementary 
identities within the group, and the hierarchy of identities between the groups. 
This process was one of the most difficult as the ‘groups’ so defined and as 
they stand in Table 1, column one, were part of my findings, rather than being 
predefined at the beginning of analysis. This process of trying to map out the 
identities was aided by an intersectional approach to the data. Analysing the 
interplay of power in the researcher-respondent relationship (see section 3.4) I 
was able to identify some key themes which would then emerge as locations of 
identity. Masculinity(ies) was one of the earliest themes that emerged from the 
detailed narrative analysis of the interviews. I started from an initial position of 
looking at ‘ethnicity’ as a stable category to base my analysis on. However, as 
my analysis deepened, it revealed the myriad manifestations of ‘interactive 
intersectionality’ (Feree, 2011) which problematized such uniform structures.   
3.4 Reflexivity 
Henry’s (2007) essay with its detailed account of her own experience in the 
field shows how the researcher's mantle is often ‘unsettling’ in the field. The 
difficulties she experienced as a young, female researcher pertained to the ways 
in which power-relations expressed themselves at the intersection of the 
researcher-respondent intersections. She coins the term ‘authority’ and 
‘authenticity’ to look at how the researcher’s role can be legitimised or 
discredited through operations of intersectional power relations.  
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Henry’s (2007) work has helped me reflect on and make sense of my field 
experiences. The feeling of being ‘in-authenticated’ and subordinated was very 
unsettling for me in a few interactions. During a group interview with 
rickshawpullers at a roadside tea-stall, one of the by-standers, snatched the 
notebook out of my hands and started reading the questions I had written in 
Bengali. He stood out as better-dressed and when I tried to ascertain how he 
was related to the group of rickshaw-pullers, he dismissed me with easy 
authority. I felt humiliated and anxious at the same time. The note book had a 
lot of personal reflections on the rickshaw-pullers I had encountered so far. 
His insistence of reading out my writing in a low voice made me feel exposed 
to others who I felt had trusted me enough to speak to me. He clearly 
commanded some respect among the rickshaw-pullers because many—
themselves illiterate—were looking at him expectantly. I had to wait till he 
finished reading my notes, taking his time, in spite of my insistence that I had 
to go somewhere else. 
During the course of the same group-interaction, a rickshaw-puller asked 
me what they could expect from talking to me. I had anticipated such 
questions and in introducing myself usually emphasized my need to talk to 
them in order to complete an assignment. I had hoped that my emphasis on 
being a student and framing the interview within my educational requirements 
would decrease expectations. However, the question made me uncomfortable. 
My halting answers, in which I said that I did not think they would gain 
anything material from it, seemed to embarrass my respondents as much it 
made me uncomfortable. They all made expressions of dissent telling me that 
surely this will help. One of the younger rickshaw-pullers even went so far as 
to say tried that surely if they supported me I could become a ‘neta’ (leader) 
who would then espouse their cause. Researchers like Abbott (2007), in trying 
to address the dilemma caused by such questions, accentuate their positionality 
(Ibid. 226) in relation to the respondents. I have tried to do them same in my 
research.  
When I failed to access the restaurant-owners in the LNB, I took the help 
of my friend. As a man from Sweden he was more easily accepted in the role 
of the researcher with me in a subordinate position as his translator. His race, 
gender and location all were a better fit for the role of the authentic and 
authoritative researcher. This created issues of exploitation of trust. Similarly, 
the instances where I gathered data from informal conversations/interviews 
from rickshaw-pullers were also ethically problematic. As I reflected on these 
two instances of not having explicit consent, I realised that the idea of written 
consent itself was problematic. The hierarchy of written consent seemed to 
embody a positivist separation between researcher and respondents. The 
realities of the context were that many of my respondents were illiterate 
and/or deeply suspicious of any form of documentation (digital or manual) 
produced through hierarchical relations of power by researchers (the 
knowledge-producing NGO worker/academic researcher or the scrutinising 
government official) with opaque and suspicious motives. And in adopting the 
role of the less authoritative translator or a chatty passenger, I was after all 
embodying, if consciously, the fluidity and fragmentary nature of identities. 
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While I was less comfortable in these roles than as a feminist, for instance, 
even in asserting that identity of affinity I have encountered difficulties.  
Lastly, in order to protect the identities of my respondents, all names have 
been changed and particularisation of certain facts that could potentially be 
used to identify them has been avoided.  
To summarise, the act of knowledge-production itself is ethically 
problematic as feminists, as well as post-structuralist and post-colonial 
theorists have demonstrated. Therefore adopting a methodology which 
disables objective claims and objectification of the respondents was seen as a 
necessary pre-requisite for this research. As a feminist, ‘situated knowledge-
production’ seemed the only answer to myriad ethical and political dilemmas. 
This chapter on methodology, following Feree’s (2011:63) exhortation to 
feminist researchers, is ‘a modest claim to limited, fallible but strategically 
useful framing [that opens the door for dialogues] allowing a reflexive 
approach…with which feminists can more broadly challenge the framework of 
inequality that enmesh us all’ 
4  Identities, agency and entitlements 
This chapter analyses fixed and fluid identities through primary research data 
by looking at multiple sites of identity formation such as ethnicity and location, 
occupational class, and gender. It also looks at questions of power and agency 
through the lens of identities and concludes with reflections on entitlements, 
mobilised through the interplay of identities. 
4.1 Problematizing forced ethnic identities 
This chapter looks to question the concept of internally cohesive and externally 
bounded ethnic identities. Pieterse (2000) writes that the ability to name a 
group as an ethnic group points to relationships of power most often reserved 
by the state and other dominant groups. Chhachhi(1991) elaborates on her 
concept of ‘forced identities’ in the context of communal riots. A forced 
identity thrust upon an individual implies the burden of signifiers attached with 
that act of naming/labelling. For instance, Muslims in India carry the double 
burden of being ‘victims’ (such as in SCR’s recommendation for positive bias 
from the state in order to empower Muslims) as well as ‘aggressors’ (as in the 
depiction of Muslims by the Hindu right) .  
The following sections elaborate upon ‘forced’ ethnic identity in the 
construction of a unitary or cohesive Afghan/Bengali identity.  These ethno-
regional categories are reified and essentialised with the burden of imposed 
significations which are constantly contested in practice. The fieldwork was 
undertaken with the purpose of looking at two ethno-regionally distinct 
sections of Muslim migrant population in Delhi in order to problematize the 
homogenous category of uniform ‘Muslim’ identity.   
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4.1.i Questioning Bengaliness 
One of the first respondents, Mazar, who with his hour-long interview 
provided rich insights into the lives of rickshaw pulling migrants like him, was 
from Katihar—a district in the state of Bihar bordering the Malda district in 
West Bengal. He spoke in Hindi-laced Bengali. Halfway through the interview 
a fellow rickshaw-puller from Uttar Pradesh (UP) accosted him quite 
aggressively and said that obviously, being a Bihari, he could not have 
knowledge of Bengali. Mazar explained, in perfect, unaccented Hindi how he 
also knew Bengali, although he is a Bihari. His emphasis on the Bihari 
identity—the knowledge of Bengali not diluting that—was striking and 
definitely helped to diffuse the situation. Mobilising his linguistic skill as an 
embodied form of cultural capital, he was able to position himself as a ‘Bihari’ 
(to the aggressive UP man) and a Bengali (to me). The initial dilemmas about 
whether or not to use this interview—and others following it where the 
respondents were from Jharkhand or Bihar and not West Bengal—were soon 
resolved as it became clear that such categorical purities were problematic.  
MAP 2 
 Map of Malda, Kathihar and Godda districts showing the border with Bangladesh   
 
Source: Maps of India. 
 
None of the respondents self-identified as Bengali although they would display 
assent when I claimed affinity on the basis of that. Most often the respondents 
identified on the basis of their location, usually district: Malda (West Bengal), 
Farakka (Jharkhand/West Bengal), Katihar(Bihar)9 (see Map 2). However, 
                                                
9 Although one respondent did say that people who come to work here are from, 
among other places, Bangladesh (‘odik’ which would translate as ‘other side’), no one 
admitted to being from Bangladesh and this was not explored any further because it 
did not elaborate on the research question. Ethnographic research on Bengali 
migrants in Delhi reveals discrimination based on the alleged ‘illegal Bangladeshi’ label 
(Ramachandran, 1999, 2003). Thus, directing queries about identity along those lines 
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within closer bonds of affinity, for instance among fellow rickshaw-pullers, the 
primary way of identifying collectively was through village-based kinship. Mitra 
et al. (2011) corroborate this finding by pointing out that fictive kinship based 
on villages of origin forms basis of social networks among migrants. A very 
common occurrence was introducing other rickshaw-pullers to me as, ‘He’s 
also from my village, didi10’. 
So the category of ‘Bengali’ became broadened into ‘Bengali speakers’.  In 
course of a group interview, the respondents unanimously agreed that 
discrimination was directed at the ‘Biharis’. When asked to elaborate, one 
respondent answered: 
People here do not know that there are rickshaw-pullers who are Bengalis. They 
only know that rickshaw-pullers are from Bihar. So they abuse us by calling us 
Bihari. 
Contrasting the response of Mazar to the rickshaw-puller from UP, with that 
of the respondent quoted above, it becomes clear how strategic the 
deployment of ethno-regional identities can be. In a country dominated by 
regional politics, the hierarchy of regional power is figured into identity. In the 
interaction between Mazar and the UP rickshaw-puller, being Bihari initially 
was synonymous with deception (deceiving the interviewer about Bengali 
identity). In the second case, being Bihari actually becomes a ‘forced’ identity 
that is synonymous with poverty and being powerless11, irrespective of actual 
geographical origins.   
       Linguistic particularities, in the form of dialect, vocabulary and 
pronunciation—as markers of difference, particularly of class,—was present in 
every interaction I had12. From Mazar giving me examples of his kind of 
Bengali (underscoring the difference with mine); to me misinterpreting words 
such as wife: ‘istiree’ in the dialect of one of my respondents from Malda and 
‘stree’ in my tongue—the language used by my respondents and me were often 
                                                                                                                        
would be reinforcing an unimportant distinction used to extort from and harass 
Bengali speakers engaged in the informal economy in Delhi. 
10 ‘Didi’ in Bengali denotes elder sister. The term when used by (adult) strangers 
denotes the double bind of closeness and respect. Even though I was probably 
younger than most of the men I interviewed they would use the term didi (as opposed 
to ‘bon’ meaning younger sister): probably as an acknowledgement of my position of 
authority over them as someone belonging to a higher class and often, also, a paying 
customer of their service. 
11 In a judgement reversing the Municipal Corporation of Delhi’s (MCD) upper ceiling 
to the number of rickshaws, the Supreme Court of India characterized the rickshaw-
pullers as ‘weak and meek’ advising the MCD to ‘take on someone its own size’ 
(Times Of India, 2012).  
12 Anindita Ghosh (2006) writes that Bengali became an arena for contestations of 
power from the eighteenth century onwards. The standardized Bengali written and 
spoken language emerged along with the new class of Hindu, western educated, 
middleclass which attempted to rid the language of its colloquial forms which came to 
be seen as a mark of the lower classes. Even today Bengali is fragmented by regional 
dialects as well as class, and my respondents did not speak the same language as me. 
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different.  Thus, even the category of ‘Bengali-speaking’ emerged as 
heterogenous. 
The Bengali national consciousness evolved, primarily as a response to 
colonial discriminations, exclusively involving Hindu (upper castes) and 
(‘educated’) middle class (Sinha, 1999) and often actively alienating the 
marginalised groups like Muslim peasantry (Chowdhury, 1998: 161). And while 
it seemed very natural for me to deploy my ‘Bengaliness’ and through it, find 
Bengalis who were pulling rickshaws, such broad ethno-linguistic/regional 
categories had little meaning for the respondents.  
Following Rapport and Dawson (1998), it can be claimed, then, that these 
circular/seasonal migrants do identify themselves in relation to a place of fixity, 
an idea of ‘home’. However, this home is not some abstract, ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson, 1991) of Bengalis which cuts across other differences 
such as class, religion or region; but is the much more tangible physical places 
of origin. These places (villages) moreover, play an active role in their 
migration and livelihoods and continue to dictate social relations in the 
destination of migration, as the following sections demonstrate. 
4.1.ii ‘Afghans’ in Delhi 
As Table 1 demonstrates, the Afghans in Delhi are a myriad group of people. 
While the most obvious categories of internal difference might be the 
refugee/migrant status and specific ethno-religious categories, the reality is 
messier. In reports and articles Afghans have been polarised into dispossessed 
victims (Bose, 2004; The Hindu, 2007) or, more recently as successful 
entrepreneurs (Saini, 2012; Stillwagon, 2011a). In the field of entrepreneurial 
activities, Afghans have historically been associated in India with activities such 
as money-lending (Bose, 2004) and dry-fruits business (Stillwagon, 2011a). 
Moreover, a number of occupations such as translators, tourist guides 
(particularly related to the large-scale phenomenon of Afghan medical tourism 
in Delhi), restaurant-owners, real-estate agents, among others, have 
mushroomed around the increasing number of Afghans visiting and settling in 
Delhi (personal interviews with Anwar, Afzal and Asif). 
Yet as Stillwagon’s (2011b) primary research in Bhogal shows, the 
categorical separation of refugees with economic migrants is not tenable: 
[T]he restaurant manager: a tall, lean Afghan man wearing a fitted black dress 
shirt [says that h]e and his family migrated to India five years ago as refugees, 
because of high unemployment and child kidnapping at home. 
Security (arising from conflict) and economic security emerge as contiguous 
issues through my primary research as well. Abid, the owner of a bakery in 
LNB, insists that he came to Delhi only for economic reasons. Yet, he is on a 
refugee card and not a visa. Asif, the co-owner of a restaurant in the LNB area 
is on a RSD waiting list. He left Afghanistan because of issues of security and 
came to Delhi on the invitation of a previous colleague who wanted a partner 
in his restaurant business. He has been in India for a few months and feels 
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frustrated at the lack of opportunities to continue his study as a person without 
any stable legal status13. 
On the other hand Tariq, the owner of a successful restaurant in Lajpat 
Nagar as well as with other business interests, is on a business visa and 
regularly goes back to Kabul where his family stays, ‘particularly during the hot 
months’. Anwar (from Khirki), currently unemployed and previously in a high 
profile job, insists, however, that there are only refugees who left Afghanistan 
fearing for their lives as most had well-paying jobs. This is clearly not the 
whole picture and one respondent, who shall remain unnamed, goes as far as 
to say that Afghans on medical and tourist visas are also setting up businesses 
in India, taking advantage of the legal loopholes. Thus, even internally the 
community has different perceptions about the reasons for leaving 
Afghanistan.  
As far as internally recognised stable markers of identity goes, most 
respondents were reluctant to reveal their ethnic origins (like Tajik, Uzbek, 
Hazara, etc14) but less reluctant to identify by language (most seemed to be 
native Dari speakers with knowledge of Pashto and Hindi-Urdu, though they 
were equivocal about identifying as either Dari or Pashto speakers). Again, all 
readily identified as Muslim but were often reluctant to identify as Shia/Sunni.  
 I chose to focus on restaurant owners from LNB because they 
represented a melange of these different positions and also because of their 
visibility (section 3.2). Visibility of the ‘Afghans’ is, however, problematic. As 
Anwar pointed out, Hindu and Sikh Afghans were mostly indistinguishable to 
the Indians because of language, physical appearance and cultural practices. I 
discovered this to be true on many occasions when I would be surprised to 
learn that a particular business was being run by Afghan Sikhs or when I would 
hear Sikh gentlemen speaking with each other in Dari. Thus, those who are 
visibly identifiable as ‘Afghans’ are usually, almost always, Muslims. Samira 
used the term ‘ethnic’ Afghan to refer to the Muslims which seems to imply 
that only Muslim Afghans have a real claim upon the term ‘Afghan’ and that 
Hindus and Sikhs are not authentic Afghans. This was elaborated by Afzal in 
his interview: 
                                                
13 Refugee card holding individuals can study in both schools and universities. 
However, private institutions often refuse to recognize these cards, issued by the 
UNHCR. Furthermore, as refugees they have limited mobility, often being confined 
within Delhi. Hotel owners and government officials, particularly outside Delhi, often 
do not accept the refugee status card as a proof of identity (personal interviews with 
Anwar and Asif). 
14 Much has been written about the ethnic divisions fuelling conflict in Afghanistan, 
especially in the context of US invasion of Afghanistan. However, Brasher’s (2011) 
analysis reveals how the fixity of such ethnic categories in Afghanistan, is fairly recent 
and the result of historical events.  ‘The localized, ambiguous and fluid state of 
identity formation was significantly altered by the communist revolution, Soviet 
invasion, and resultant widespread mujahideen resistance’ (Ibid. 112). Whereas the 
‘Soviet-backed Communist regime officially recognized eight nationalities’ a more 
recent survey has identified fifty five (Ibid). 
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Afzal: Afghan Sikhs are basically Indian origin [if you] trace back and that’s why 
Indian government provide[s] them with visa easily. So they’re staying legally. 
Me: So they are coming on business visas? 
Afzal: No…as of now they have residential permit, RP. So they have no 
problem, they can work. Government can’t object [to] them, you know. Because 
they are Indian origin so till the time they can get their naturalisation they are 
treated as an Indian, half-Indian… 
Thus, these interviews reveal that the ‘Afghan’ as a stable identifier is not a 
tenable category. While the respondents strategically lay claim to an Afghan 
identity for different reasons, it is internally differentiated.  
4.1.iii Forced identities and discrimination 
It interestingly emerged that while the forced identification as ‘Muslim’ created 
negative stigma associated with Bengali speakers (as ‘Bangladeshi infiltrators’15), 
it did not seem to correspond with the experiences of Afghans living in Delhi. 
Most of my respondents of Afghan origin confirmed that while they had to 
pay higher rents as compared to ‘locals’, they were not routinely harassed by 
the authorities as for instance is commonplace in Iran, for Afghan refugees 
(personal interview). Yet, many also agreed that the general perception about 
people from Afghanistan equated them with Talibans (personal interviews). 
Abid, one of my respondents from Mazhar-e-Sharif and the most cautious and 
tight-lipped of the respondents, tried to distance himself from the 
‘disturbances’ in Afghanistan repeatedly during the two interviews. He said he 
did not know about the situation since nothing ‘like that’ happened in the cities 
but only in remote places. He even pointed to my collaborator saying: 
Actually I don’t know much about the situation…These people [white 
foreigners] will know much more than me about those things. 
In explaining why the ‘housing apartheid’ (Ashok and Ali, 2012) did not 
affect Muslims of Afghan origin in a non-Muslim residential neighbourhood 
like Lajpat Nagar, Afzal offered an explanation. According to him the 
neighbourhood, originally a refugee colony set up for refugees (Hindus and 
Sikhs) leaving Pakistan during the partition of 1947, was more sympathetic to 
the plight of refugees having to leave their country of origin. This seems not 
entirely probable—in Bhogal with its higher concentration of Muslim Afghans, 
the Delhi Police’s public service announcements in the busy market area 
consists of messages cautioning residents about the necessity of verifying the 
identities of people seeking employment or seeking to rent property so as to 
                                                
15 My respondents were mostly silent and reluctant to respond directly my questions 
about discrimination on the basis of being Muslim and whether that led to stereotypes 
about Bangaladeshi immigrants. However, in course of my interaction with Bengali 
Muslim waste pickers through my work in an NGO, I was repeatedly told about 
police harassment based on such stereotypes (see also: Dalmia, 2009). 
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avoid terrorists16. All the respondents of Afghan origins mentioned the fact 
that they had to pay higher rents, which might also act as a mitigating factor for 
the landlords who benefit more. Overall, it does seem that the ‘Taliban-
Afghan’ stereotype has not become hardened into official practise and 
mainstream discourse (through the efforts of the Hindu right) as in the case of 
the ‘Bangladeshi-infiltrators’. And thus the ‘official script’ (Ramachandran, 
1999) seems to considerably affect and influence everyday social practices of 
discrimination. While people may conflate Afghans with Taliban and 
terrorists17, the official leniency towards Afghans has influenced actual practice.  
Interestingly enough, the rickshaw-pullers, although very forthcoming on 
most subjects were very reluctant to discuss religious discrimination. When 
pressed, the respondents in the group interview identified the police as 
harassers. But, particularly, when I tried to ascertain harassment pertaining to 
being identified as Bengali-speaking Muslims, there was uncomfortable, but 
resolute silence in several interview situations18. As Poland and Pederson 
(1998:294) point out, silences in qualitative research can be ‘profoundly 
meaningful’. However, rather than trying to analyse the meaning of the 
silences, I would like to suggest that the silences on part of the respondents 
was one of the most important way of resisting the efforts of an outsider-
researcher to probe the realms of the personal. While the silence might indicate 
the fear of being identified as Muslim to an obviously Hindu (-named) 
researcher, it was also an indication that resistance to someone from a superior 
class position cannot always take the form of a direct, verbal refusal to answer. 
And silence, therefore, is a strategy to assert certain boundaries that I was 
stepping over through my questions. Silencing, is usually seen in a negative 
light, and silences often taken to affirm subordination, fear and oppression. 
But whether or not it indicates fear, it clearly demonstrates agentic capacity in 
the respondents’ refusal to reveal.  
4.2 Identities of affinity related to livelihoods 
This section will examine how occupational status is reflected in the self-
identifications of the rickshaw-pullers and restaurant owners. These claims will 
be examined in light of Standing’s (2011) elaboration of occupational insecurity 
                                                
16 The message (in Hindi) also exhorts the residents to report ‘suspicious persons’ and 
ends with the salutary ‘Jai Hind!’ or ‘hail to India’ in a scary association with the 
Hindutva rhetoric. These messages are particularly noticeable because of their 
complete absence from the nearby, busier Lajpat Nagar market where the cautionary 
messages pertain to warnings about pickpocketing and other similar messages for the 
consumers.  
17 A casual chat with one of my Hindu neighbours revealed this to be true. In course 
of a conversation I mentioned Afghan restaurants and he commented on the rising 
number of ‘these people’ and expressed his fears for security.  
18 Exception to this silence came during an informal conversation during a rickshaw 
ride, where the rickshaw-puller, on being asked if it was difficult to drive rickshaws 
during the fasts of the Ramzan, vehemently exclaimed that he was Hindu.  
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in a changing global economic regime. Bourdieu’s (1986) elaboration on the 
forms of capital will be used to elaborate on the occupational hierarchies.  
4.2.i Occupational Identities 
Connell (2005:55-56) points out centrality of the (male) body in the labour 
market and that the division of class is reflected in the embodied possession of 
‘skill’ (middle class men) versus the possession of ‘force’ (working class men). 
In the following analysis, occupational identity is related to class by examining 
the respondents’ labour status as well as their identification with the ‘force’-
‘skill’ binary.  
The rickshaw-pullers are seasonal, male migrants who come to Delhi 
without families. The ARC (2007) has identified this group as the most 
vulnerable among the self-employed section within the informal economy. 
While, they are classified as own account workers, in reality their means of 
production is not completely controlled by them: they rent the rickshaws at 
forty to fifty rupees per day19 . This, then, destabilises neat labour status 
categories. While circular migration in itself points to multiple occupations--all 
respondents owned and often worked on agricultural land--the migration itself 
was multi-locational and spanning multiple jobs. Respondents indicated that 
they worked as construction labourers and embroidery workers besides pulling 
rickshaws. Standing’s (2009) argument about the erosion of occupational 
communities and the consequent erosion of the strength of bargaining seems 
eminently applicable in the case of the migrant rickshaw-pullers. Jhagru, one of 
the most voluble respondents said: 
We don’t have unity here...Among people from the same village, yes but not 
among people from the different villages. If in a Bengali village in Farakka 
someone slaps a van driver20 , there will be hartals21 ...Here someone can come 
and slap me around...because I have nobody, I’m powerless here...If we [from the 
same village] try to set up a union, then the others [residents of other villages] 
will come and create a lot of hullabaloo 
Thus, village based communities take precedence over occupational 
associations in the city, although this picture seems different in the villages of 
origin. The more stable occupational identities in villages become much more 
blurry with migration to the cities. At the same time, occupations undertaken 
                                                
19 The Article 3(1) of the Section 481 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (1958) 
stipulates that a rickshaw puller must be the rickshaw owner and a person can own 
only one rickshaw (with exceptions in case of physically challenged persons and 
widows, in which case they are allowed to own upto five rickshaws) (See: Kishwar, 
2001). However, from the primary research it emerged that most owners, from whom 
the respondents rented, possessed dozens of rickshaws.  
20 Cycle vans are a rural form of transportation, absent from cities 
21  Hartal literally translates as ‘strike’ in English. However, hartal in contemporary 
politics of India (and West Bengal) can connote more than just peaceful civil 
disobedience and assume the form of forceful shutdowns and violence in a show of 
power. 
33 
 
in the villages often become part of more stable occupational identity. Working 
on agricultural land was the most common occupation.  Mazar, for example, 
said that the remittances from his work in Delhi (and other cities like Surat and 
Pune) went into buying seeds, fertilizers and pesticide. Even if some of them 
spent four months or less, per year, in the villages, most talked about taking 
part in farming. Jhagru, for instance, went into detailed descriptions of the crop 
cycle and how that reflects the rhythms of migration: 
After this [monsoon] I will go home for the reaping of paddy...then [it will be 
time for] sowing wheat [and lentils] and after that I will be coming back here 
Some migrants viewed this work as a hiatus from their actual occupations. Ali, 
from Malda, viewed his work in the cities as a temporary strategy to avoid 
impoverishment. His land has been made uncultivable by riverine floods a few 
years ago. Working as a rickshaw-puller paid more than the wage of a day 
labourer in his village and he will continue to come to the city until his land 
becomes cultivable again.  Only one respondent said that he came to Delhi to 
earn capital to invest back into his business of selling clothes in Malda.  
The label ‘rickshaw-pullers’ used in this research as well as other reports 
like the ARC, is clearly not how these migrants identify themselves but more a 
way of identifying them in the official script . Though it emerges as 
problematic, I am continuing to use the term in this paper for the sake of 
convenience.  
In terms of the force-skill binary, Jhagru’s testimony on agriculture was 
definitely given with the fact in mind that his audience, me, was unskilled in the 
ways of crop seasons. However, rickshaw-pulling was not defined as a ‘skill’, 
probably because it was not identified within the realm of ‘occupation’. The 
idea of force (or lack thereof) is discussed in detail in Section 4.3.  
‘Skill’ emerged as an important locus of identity in the responses of the 
restaurant owners. When asked how he set up his shop, Abid said: 
Here no one has the know-how. I made this oven myself. I wouldn’t trust anyone 
else to do it properly. 
An erstwhile owner of a similar bakery in Mazar-e-Sharif, Abid has come 
to Delhi because business was not so good back home. He has refugee status 
under the mandate of the UNHCR. His employees followed him from Mazar-
e-Sharif, once he set up his business. In spite, of his self-proclaimed skills as a 
baker, the actual baking was done by the three workers (also card holding 
refugees). In case of Abid’s enterprise, the difference in labour status between 
the employer and the employees was not very stark--all four shared a room in 
the neighbourhood. This is probably due to the common place of origin, and 
may even be actual kinship bonds. Abid was not very forthcoming in his 
responses.  
Afzal, definitely occupying a higher class position than Abid with his 
diversified business enterprises, also occupied the same labour status category 
of an employer. The labour status differences between him and his employees, 
however, were far greater. He was much more invested in the idea of skill as 
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opposed to kinship. He was at pains to establish that he did not offer jobs on 
the basis of a common ethnic identity: 
I know a guy some days back he…came to my place [to ask for a job in the 
restaurant. He said] ‘I’ve been here for the past one month and I don’t have 
money.... I can do any [work]. But I can only work for two months…I’ll work I’ll 
earn and then I can go back [to Afghanistan]’. I said no, I don’t want...Most 
people [Afghans] are unemployed. Only those with skills of cooking and working 
in restaurant [are employed] 
Kinship—whether through affirmation or denial of it—frequently emerged as 
an important condition in defining identities of affinity within occupational 
communities. The next section looks at how kinship identities are mobilized in 
occupations. 
4.2.ii Operation of capitals through identities of locational 
affinities 
Prasad-Aleyamma (2011:180) points out that migration ‘needs to be viewed as 
a social as well as economic process’. Bremen (1996:260), in context of labour 
circulation, writes how the informal migrants’ ‘collective identities are asserted 
and reproduced’ and ‘investment’ in loyalties of ‘caste, religion, regional origin, 
etc’ (Ibid. 257) is valued. The role of social capital through networks of 
solidarity among migrants in the Indian context has been examined by, among 
others, Mitra et al.(2011). This section will look at the operations of social 
capital based on identities of location. 
Identities based on the locational origin is often the bond that holds the 
migrant community together as mentioned briefly in sections 4.1 and 4.1.1. In 
a world of constant circulation, the locational fixity of ‘home’ becomes a 
powerful identity of affinity (Rapport and Dawson, 1998). However, reifying 
the idea of home as fixed can also become problematic as I will try to 
demonstrate. 
        All the respondents who worked as rickshaw-pullers in Delhi, mentioned 
that they came to Delhi because others in their villages had done so before 
them. People from the same village shared accommodation and costs of living 
and rented rickshaws from the same person. All this was possible because of a 
shared identity--often literally, in the form of shared documents of identity that 
a new migrant had to show to the rickshaw owner. Many rickshaw-pullers, 
particularly younger ones, did not have a voters’ identity card or similar 
documents and had to depend on another co-villager with an acceptable 
document to vouch for him. Social capital also functions as a principle of 
exclusion in that locational identities are narrowly defined in terms of a village. 
So that anyone not from that village becomes an outsider.  
However, there are intra-group differences in status, as with a rickshaw-
puller who had a Master’s degree. In this case, the inter-village differences are 
temporarily resolved in order to present someone whose accomplishments are 
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equal22 to that of the outsider. By extension, the symbolic status accrued by his 
educational qualifications is also reflected upon his peers. However, this rather 
diffident man was not the most vocal or prominent among the group. Thus, 
institutionalised cultural capital (in the form of his degree), through its failure 
to convert itself into economic capital (in the form of a respectable job), also 
failed to accrue lasting symbolic gains in the form of tangible honour as a 
spokesperson for the group.  
Livelihood and location become interlinked within networks of social 
affiliations through hierarchies of status. In the process of circulating for 
livelihoods, the bonds forged from a common locational identity become the 
only dependable source of security, although differences in status continue to 
persist within these groups. Circulation, for Bremen (1996:255) is a livelihood 
strategy related to resistance. Through their refusal to the settle down, the 
‘footloose’ workers in the informal economy are registering their protest to the 
harsh and oppressive conditions of work (Ibid.). 
       At the same time, essentialising locational identities that refer back to a 
fixed ‘home’ (Rapport and Dawson, 1998), emerges as problematic through the 
responses obtained from the restaurant owners originating from Afghanistan. 
For Afzal his familial occupation of business is the basis for a complex of 
identities that span both Afghanistan and India. When asked about how he 
came to set up a restaurant he said: 
We're into export import business...You know, we actually have long term 
business between India and Afghanistan--more than fifty years...My grandfather 
used to have this...dry fruits [business]. So that’s the thing. I have long relation 
with India 
He migrated with his family to India more than two decades ago.  Growing up 
in an Afghan community in India has created complex allegiances. On the one 
hand, he takes pride his origins in Mazar-e-Sharif which has ‘the best food in 
Afghanistan’ and is ‘safer than Delhi’. On the other hand, he’s bothered about 
the ‘state of law and order’ India. Afzal constantly contrasts himself with other 
Afghan business owners to demonstrate he does not depend on his of Afghan 
origins to gain economic benefit from the social network: 
 
Many of these hospitals have approached me. That you have restaurant: you send 
us customers--patients [and] we’ll give you this much, we’ll give you this much. I 
said no. I’m not interested...Other restaurants take commission I know.  
Yet, by his own admission ‘too many Afghans coming to Delhi’ and it is 
because of these Afghans, forming ‘ninety percent of [his] clientele’, that he 
was able to diversify the family business into restaurants. As Saini’s (2012) 
report shows, a whole plethora of informal livelihoods have sprung up around 
the Afghan (medical) tourists and diaspora. The multiplying numbers of 
restaurants are part of this scenario. Thus, in spite of his articulated rejection of 
it, he does benefit from the network of connections among people coming 
                                                
22 As a masters student myself, I felt awkward at this wide gap in our economic status 
in spite of the same educational qualifications. 
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from Afghanistan. Pictures on the walls of the restaurant also display certain 
specific locations in Afghanistan underscoring the fact that he is deploying his 
locational identity as part of his economic strategy. The context of his 
interview, with the presence of an Indian, might certainly have influenced his 
emphasis on his Indianness. But more importantly, it is probably also a 
function of his class. He did not depend on the place-based social networks 
like the rickshaw-pullers did. 
      Abid, on the other hand, clearly occupying a lower class position as the 
owner of a single small bakery, depended much more on his social network. 
His employees came from Mazar-e-Sharif like him and they pooled in 
resources like accommodation. The hierarchy of class and occupational status 
is thus reflected in the need for mobilising social capital based on a common 
identity of location. Social capital may persist nonetheless in aiding the 
accumulation of economic capital. 
Impoverishment is often seen as a failure of social capital mobilised 
through such networks of affinitive identities of location. Pieterse (2000:15) 
quotes Portes and Landolt who point out that inspite of the availability of 
ample social capital residents of a ghetto are often unable to pull themselves 
out of poverty due to ‘lack of economic resources—beginning with decent 
jobs’. While this appears to be true on the basis of the primary research in this 
paper, what is perhaps missing is an assessment of the nature of social capital. 
In its fragmentary and informal forms that are available to the rickshaw-pullers, 
social capital is crucial for those in dire need and does not necessarily lead to 
accumulation of economic or other forms of capital. However, in case of the 
restaurant owners it often exists in more formalised structures. For instance, 
there exists an informal association comprising of people of (diverse) Afghan 
origin(s) (personal interviews with Anwar) which represents social capital in a 
more organised form. Finally, social networks are not a ‘natural given’ 
(Bourdieu, 1986) and by constantly mobilising identities of location they are 
maintained and strengthened.  
The next section examines the gendered identities of the respondents. 
 
 
 
4.3 Performances of masculinity: authority and meekness 
Performances of masculinity by the respondents were related to their 
behaviour towards me, the female researcher, and their attitudes towards other 
women as well as how they placed themselves in relation to other men. 
Mazar—in course of an interview in which he had changed from the 
deferential ‘apni’ to the more informal ‘tumi’23—asked me to assess his 
appearance. I hesitated because I did not know whether he wanted me to 
                                                
23 ‘Apni’ and ‘tumi’ both translate as ‘you’ but differ in degrees of respect indicated, 
much like the French ‘vous’ and ‘tu’  
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compliment him or express sympathy at his impoverished form and if his 
question indicated unwelcome (sexual) advances. As I was hesitating, he 
answered it himself:  the poorly remunerated hard physical work with poor 
nutritional value of the meals he could afford has reduced his ‘figure to this’. 
This is clearly meant to invoke sympathy.   
At the end of the interview I asked him to give me a ride, wanting to 
compensate him for his time. He drove very fast while talking to me, and 
insisted that he could actually earn quite a lot from plying rickshaws.  Both the 
verbal assertions and the supportive action of driving (fast) skilfully, seemed to 
be directed at inverting his previous statements about his weakness. In course 
of the interview, where as an interviewer I had an authoritative position, his 
self-depiction reflected this hierarchy of power. However, gaining control by 
conveying me in his rickshaw he had reversed that relationship. The expression 
of his agentic control became, his rash speed/skill. His self-assurance in this 
position of power, even overcame the constraints of a lower class position, so 
that he offered to look for (gender appropriate) jobs24 for me. 
Mazar’s interview also had a number of metaphors. He came to Punjab as 
a teenager, working for his brother-in-law who was a labour contractor.  Trying 
to explain his insubordination to his brother-in-law who made him do 
housework he said: 
I am not some kind of girl that I will keep cooking for you [the brother-in-law]. 
This insubordination to a male authorial figure, probably at least partly fictive, 
is in direct contrast to his accounts of his performances of 
subordination/meekness in his role as a migrant in Delhi. He asserted that it 
was dangerous to drive rickshaws after nine at night because drunks demand 
rides and then don’t pay. When asked why he doesn’t protest he evocatively 
replied: 
Jaan ka dar hai na (I fear for my life). 
This is in keeping with the hierarchy of hegemonic and subordinate regional 
masculinities where North Indian local men can threaten migrants from the 
eastern states with impunity. The Supreme Court’s characterisation of 
rickshaw-pullers as meek and the actions of MCD as not befitting their ‘size’ 
(Times of India, 2012, footnote: 11) evokes, the image of the ‘wimpy’ (Connell, 
2005: 7925) Bengalis and the more masculine North Indians from colonial times 
(Sinha, 1999; Chowdhury, 1998). 
Occupational hierarchy is also figured through these hierarchies of 
manliness.  A report (Aman Trust, n.d) on the informal transport sector in 
Delhi makes the interesting observation that migration and demographic 
patterns in occupations have co-relation: 
                                                
24 He asked me whether I would be able to teach at primary level schools when I 
rejected his proposition to work in a factory 
25 This, in practical terms, problematizes Connell’s separation of ‘subordinate’ and 
‘marginalised’ masculinities within the Indian context. (Section 2.4) 
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[M]ost bus drivers and conductors are from Western U.P.  This occupation 
almost demands a high level of aggressive behaviour. The general social 
perception indicates that men from U.P. are more belligerent than others. 
Rickshaw-pullers on the other hand are mainly from Bengal and are considered 
meek and timid.  
This hierarchy of manly aggression is reflected in Afzal’s responses where he 
contrasts the extreme aggression of Afghans with the legitimate aggression of 
(some) Indians: 
Too much aggressive people are in Afghanistan…here if you shout to 
rickshawalla [to] go from here, he go[es] without, you know, replying or 
something. There if you shout [h]e will either come and abuse you …or hit 
you… [So] if you fight with poor people you can’t say that no he’s poor he can’t 
beat me. Or…reply back. That’s the thing. Everyone thinks that [they’re] 
powerful. Whether [they’re] rich or poor 
When asked about harassment by the police, rickshaw-pullers reported both 
extortion and physical intimidation. On the one hand the police collect a 
monthly fee to let the rickshaw-pullers park and take breaks in certain areas. 
On the other they regularly force the rickshaw-pullers to do menial jobs like 
cleaning their shoes. One Afghan restaurant owner also confirmed that the 
police come for a monthly ‘fee’ but insisted that there was no harassment.  
Both these accounts were corroborated by observations in course of the 
research. During a lunch with my co-researcher at an Afghan restaurant, we 
observed two police constables at the restaurant. They were treated 
courteously and offered beverages. After some muted exchange with the staff 
at the cash desk, they went away with clearly some transaction having taken 
place. At a rickshaw stand in the Lajpat Nagar market I observed the police 
hitting a younger rickshaw-puller. Both the recipient of the blows as well as the 
fellow rickshaw-pullers were laughing in stark contrast to the frowning police 
constable. After a few slaps, the rickshaw-puller was commanded to shift a 
heavy bench, used by the constables, to a more shady location. While the 
humiliation that the rickshaw-pullers were subjected to was painfully obvious, 
their reaction was in keeping with performances of a subordinate masculinity. 
Anger and aggression, the prerogative of those exercising manly control, was 
not available to them (Bremen, 1996). Jocularity can then be read as not simply 
a performance of meekness, which might erupt into violence in another 
context (Ibid.; section 2.4) but also as a strategy to deal with the daily realities 
of living in a hostile city. Following Mahmood (2001) I would argue that 
through such performances of ‘embodied submission’ the rickshaw-pullers 
continue to negotiate lives and livelihoods in Delhi.  
The sphere of masculinity (as defined through work) was also emphasised 
in contrast to ideas of women’s work. As stated above, resisting authority, in 
case of Mazar, was expressed by asserting his manliness in refusing to do 
women’s work. Rahim, another rickshaw-puller defended his (and others’) 
decision to migrate singly by contrasting the hardships in the male sphere of 
work with female sphere of domesticity: 
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If you bring your family26 here it will get destroyed…This is no place…There [in 
the village] we have everyone, we have to go back… 
Mazar corroborates this in his interview saying that he goes home with his 
earnings so he can rest for a while. Once he gets ‘bored’ (he used the English 
word) he comes back to Delhi to feel lighter: dimag halka karne ki liye27 .  Thus, 
the restful domestic sphere is not only contrasted with the action packed male 
world in the city, but the binary is also hierarchized. Of course, this 
representation might not be the whole picture: Mazar’s forays into the village 
and return to the cities might correspond with how long the remittances last in 
a rural household. The contact of these two spheres—village/domestic/private 
and city/occupational/public is deeply unsettling as Rahim and others in the 
group interview assert: 
Our women will never leave their bhite28--they might die from hunger, but the 
Malda women will never come here 
Irrespective of what ‘Malda women’ might actually want, accruing honour 
from locational identity ultimately rests on the behaviour of women at home. 
This corroborates Siegmann’s (2010) work in rural Northwest Pakistan about 
the honour of women left behind by migrating men.  
Similarly both Anwar and Afzal talk about the dishonour heaped upon the 
women of Afghan origin who work in Delhi. Some women earn a lot as 
translators and Anwar asserts that their success is a reason why men insinuate 
that they ‘have bad character’. Anwar’s wife adds that her husband is 
exceptional (within the ‘Afghan’ community) in that she is allowed to go out as 
she pleases: 
Many women here complain that their husbands are very controlling. They can’t 
even go out of the houses alone29.  
Male control over women’s action in general, and their work outside the 
domestic sphere in particular, seems necessary in maintaining male honour, 
which is ‘vested in women but [remains] the property of men’ (Rose, 2009). 
Afzal says: 
Actually many girls [come to my] restaurant here…asking me [for work]. I refuse 
them. Because once you keep a girl or a woman in your restaurant, especially in 
Afghani restaurant…people will think yeah, he’s earning from this lady or from 
this woman. Maybe beside this restaurant he’s doing something else, you know? 
[Their] minds work differently you know. So that’s why I never kept a lady in my 
restaurant. Never. 
Women’s work that is ‘labour’30 as opposed to unpaid care work, therefore, 
continues to pose challenges to constructions of hegemonic masculinities in 
                                                
26 He used the Bengali word ‘poribar’ which might indicate ‘wife’ as well as ‘family’ 
27 To make the mind lighter.  
28 Literally: ‘ancestral piece of land’ 
29 However, there are other dimensions to this picture. Stillwagon’s (2011c) research 
shows there are Afghan girls ‘studying to be doctors’ while also earning for their 
families, for instance 
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relation to subordinated femininities whether in case of the wimpy ‘Bengalis’ or 
the more manly ‘Afghans’. The lack of narratives/performances of masculinity 
in the interviews with Afghan men in this section is, at least in part, due to the 
fact that they were addressing themselves to a male researcher unlike the 
rickshaw-pullers. 
4.4 Migrants’ entitlements in the city 
This section critically examines the migrants’ entitlements in the city in light of 
the previous sections of this chapter. From the sections above, it emerges 
clearly that the entitlements of the migrants are related to their class, locations 
as well as their occupational status (and the two are not necessarily the one and 
the same).  
In trying to establish a stake to the city, embodied cultural capital was 
often mobilised by the respondents. . Bourdieu (1986:49) recognises 
‘pronunciation characteristics of a class or a region’ as an embodied form of 
cultural capital. On the basis of my primary research, I will extend the 
application to acquiring/possessing linguistic skills. Through the interviews it 
emerged that the knowledge of Hindi—which is perceived as a ‘local’ 
language—was an important marker of difference. The rickshaw-pullers, 
particularly those who were relative newcomers to the city, had strongly 
(Bengali) accented Hindi which marked them as outsiders. On the other hand 
many respondents from Afghanistan displayed their knowledge of Hindi as an 
insider status. Abid said: 
My father used to bring Bollywood films all the time. We have grown up 
watching those films. I knew Hindi since my childhood. 
Similarly Anwar asserted: 
I had five Hindu classmates [in my school in Kandahar]. I learnt Hindi from 
them. I still remember their names.  
The knowledge of a local language, thus strengthens claims to the city.  
The two groups of respondents also have markedly different physical 
attributes. Anwar testified to how physical appearance and legitimacy as an 
‘insider’ are related: 
In Iran they recognise you as Afghan by looking at your face. There’s more 
harassment—showing identity cards...Here when people look at me they think I 
am from Assam or something. My wife, she wears kurtas…like you, and she grew 
up in Pakistan. So the autowallas can never tell that she’s not local. When my 
Iranian neighbours look for an auto, they [always get an inflated price]. 
Thus, physical appearance—comprised of bodily and sartorial attributes—
becomes a marker of legitimacy.  
                                                                                                                        
30 Feminist researchers such as Diane Elson (1999) have long demonstrated how 
women’s reproductive and care work in the domestic sphere have been relegated to 
the realm of unproductive and not considered labour.  
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Bhan (2009) asserts that the ideal citizen type for millennial Delhi is the 
‘aspirational middle-class consumer citizen’ and the rickshaw-pullers are 
situated much further away from this category than the restaurant owners and 
other Afghan-origin respondents like Anwar. Class being a marker of 
entitlements and reflected in attributes like clothes, the respondents originating 
from Afghanistan, for instance, in being better dressed than the rickshaw-
pullers, are therefore, closer to the ideal citizen type. 
The rickshaw-pullers with the lack of a stable occupational identity fit very 
well within Standing’s (2011) conception of the precariat which supersedes the 
traditional conception of the proletariat. Their weak entitlements in the city can 
be characterised as denizenship (Ibid.) 
The analysis has thus, enabled a separation of the rickshaw-pulling 
denizens (mostly with legal citizenship rights) from the refugees and migrants 
from Afghanistan (often with legal denizen status). The latter, irrespective of 
their legally circumscribed rights as less-than-citizens, are often able to mobilise 
rights to the city, through identities that are considered more legitimate within 
the urban citizenship discourse of Delhi.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Through the analysis, I have tried to demonstrate the dangers of homogenizing 
subjects. The homogenized subject—Muslim migrant man—has thus been 
effectively deconstructed. Chapter 5 looks at the implications this has for 
mobilising RTTC as a rights framework to reframe urban citizenship in a more 
inclusive manner.  
5   Conclusion 
This paper argues that homogenizing the Muslim male migrants as victims is 
problematic (Chapter 1). By looking at theories of identity, ethnicity, class and 
hierarchized masculinities I have tried to set up a broad framework through 
which to analyse the narratives of the respondents (Chapter 2). The 
methodological framework, following in footsteps of prior feminist research, 
enabled me to situate myself in the research context (Chapter 3). Through the 
narratives of the migrants, collected in interviews, I have tried to problematize 
markers of identity such as ethnicity as inherently unstable. The narratives of 
the migrants reveal identities as sites of constant struggle between the multiple 
allegiances through which they express their agency and structure their 
entitlements (Chapter 4). Following the framework of urban citizenship and 
RTTC (Chapter 2), in this chapter I will examine some of the policy 
implications of my findings in the context of Delhi.  
The MPD-2021(Appendix II) can be taken as representative of the current 
model of developmental imagination, in context of the Indian metropolises. 
Baviskar (2003:92) shows how the previous Master Plans of Delhi have 
violated their own objectives and created squatter settlements through the 
indirect employment of casual migrant labourers in the process of 
infrastructural development. In trying to ‘orchestrate a transformation that will 
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make Delhi an ideal urban space’(Ibid), the Master Plans keep neglecting 
informality as an integral part of the urban landscape. Roy (2005:155-6) points 
to this tendency in urban planning as treating informal spaces ‘as the exception 
to planning, lying outside its realm of control’. Urban planning that is unable 
‘to think about the complex social systems through which plans must be 
implemented’ (Ibid.) therefore, continues to contradict itself like the Master 
Plans of the DDA.  
The solution, says Roy (Ibid.) is to reformulate urban planning by ‘moving 
from land use to distributive justice, [and] rethinking the object of 
development’. What, then, one can ask, would this reformulated object of 
development look like? The proponents of the RTTC model under the 
auspices of UNESCO/UN-HABITAT (Dupont, et al, 2011:11) propose it as 
‘an agenda for change’. The more radical proponents of RTTC like Harvey 
(2008:23) see it as the ‘right to change ourselves by changing the city’.  
Both these formulations fall short. The first, in its generalisations of ‘the 
urban poor and the migrant workers’ (Dupont et al, 2011:11) fails to take into 
account the diversity in this vast group. The second in its aim to reject easy 
functionalism, fashions itself into an articulation of transformative politics that 
is very easily relegated to the realm of the moral (Baxi, 2011: 17) and dismissed 
as having little bearing on actual policies. 
However, the need to substantively challenge and transform the 
development vision as articulated by policy documents such as MPD-2021 and 
others, is undeniable. Going back, now, to my analysis, I would suggest, that a 
first step in envisioning better policy, should be to look at the actual diversity 
of realities and the different needs stemming from those realities. To ignore the 
very real investments of the migrants’ in their diverse aspirations, by abstract 
articulations of ‘taking back the city’ or ‘empowering the disempowered’ is to 
continue to delegitimise them.  Visualising the migrants and informal workers 
as voiceless and disempowered, then, is certainly a form of, to borrow Spivak’s 
(1988) term, ‘epistemic violence’.  
Although, surely a migrant rickshaw-puller in Delhi does not want to be 
humiliated by the police, does he really envision himself as a stake holder in the 
transformative politics of the urban space? My findings as elaborated in this 
paper, underlines how important the ‘primordial ties’ (Breman, 1996:255-6) of 
kinship and locational origin are among the ‘footloose’ (Ibid.) migrants. While 
it seems obvious to address their substantive needs—such as access to 
housing—it is inevitable that, this will lead to deepening their involvement in 
the city. In my findings, the tenuous bonds with the urban space for the 
rickshaw-pullers have been, for the most part, created by  the very real 
discriminatory practices in Delhi and hence, their need to re-affirm the ties of 
kinship, neighbourliness, etc. However, and this is a gap in my research which 
needs to be explored further, there is no indication  of what these migrants 
would, when given real opportunities to belong in the city, choose. Will these 
‘wage hunters and gatherers’ (Ibid) in whose evasive circulation Breman sees a 
way of holding onto dignity, settle down (to continue the metaphor) if they are 
able to fully exercise their rights to the city? This will have to be answered by 
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the migrants themselves and assessed through the parameters of their 
(changing) needs and points to the scope for further research in this direction.  
The Afghan refugees and migrants are an even more internally diverse 
group in terms of their actual legal rights. The RTTC therefore, will need to 
adapt itself to multiple dimensions of these needs. On the one hand as primary 
research with the Afghan diaspora shows (Stillwagon, 2011a & 2011b; Bose, 
2004) there are very urgent issues to address. The need to formulate a uniform 
policy for all asylum seekers and refugees31 , the need to hasten the process of 
RSD and ensuring financial support for those in need of it, seem foremost 
among many others. My findings do however suggest that the Indian 
government is taking steps to address some issues in case of the Afghan 
refugees (personal interviews with Anwar and Samira) particularly regarding 
the issuing of work permits to refugees. While most refugees in Delhi still look 
for resettlements to countries of the North (personal interviews with Asif and 
Anwar), they do lack opportunities to work or continue their studies which 
causes a lot of frustration. On the other hand, most refugee-card holders, 
particularly the wage earners, who are taking part in the informal economy of 
Delhi, clearly do so because of economic needs. While the government’s 
overall leniency at present allows such enterprises to flourish and provides 
employment for a substantial section of the Afghan diaspora, there is no actual 
guarantee that this will not change. Overall, any change in this policy will affect 
only those with the least opportunities—not the owners of bigger enterprises 
with access to substantial economic capital. Therefore, the RTTC framework, 
in the context of Delhi must also take into account, the rights of these urban 
citizens.  
To sum up, by pointing out that multiple identities can be the sites of 
agency for the delegitimised citizens of Delhi, this research problematizes the 
uniformity of the policy/rights framework that the RTTC discourse, in its two 
dominant conceptions, suggests. Although some broad parameters for 
modifying current policies have been recommended, there is need for further 
situated explorations in this area.  
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Appendix: Delhi Master Plan 2021 
 
INTRODUCTION 
      
1. Delhi, the focus of the socio-economic and political life of India, a symbol 
of ancient values and aspirations and capital of the largest democracy, is 
assuming increasing eminence among the great cities of the world. 
      
Growing at an unprecedented pace, the city needs to be able to integrate 
its elegant past as well as the modern developments into an organic whole, 
which demands a purposeful transformation of the socio economic, natural 
and built environment. A prime mover and nerve centre of ideas and actions, 
the seat of national governance and a centre of business, culture, education and 
sports, Delhi, however, stands at the crossroads today. The choice is between 
either taking a road to indiscriminate uncontrolled development and slide 
towards chaos or a movement towards making Delhi a world- class city, if 
handled with vision and care. 
      
2. Apart from critical issues such as land, physical infrastructure, transport, 
the ecology and environment, housing and other socio cultural and other 
institutional facilities, the cornerstone for making Delhi a world- class city 
is the planning process itself and related aspects of governance and 
management. 
      
VISION 
      
3. The Vision-2021 is to make Delhi a global metropolis and a world-class 
city, where all the people are engaged in productive work with a decent 
standard of living and quality of life in a sustainable environment. This will 
inter alia, necessitate planning and action to meet the challenge of 
population growth and in migration into Delhi and even measures to 
restrict it to the extent possible; provision of adequate housing, 
particularly for the weaker sections of the society; addressing the problems 
of small enterprises, particularly in the unorganized informal sec tor; 
dealing with the issue of slums, both as an issue pertaining to the cityscape 
and of shelter; up-gradation of old and dilapidated areas of the city; 
provision of adequate infrastructure services; conservation of the 
environment; preservation of Delhi’s heritage and blending it with the new 
and complex modern patterns of development; and doing all this within a 
framework of sustainable development, public-private and community 
participation and a spirit of ownership and belonging among its citizens. 
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REVIEW OF PAST EXPERIENCE 
      
4. The process of planned development of the National Capital began with 
enactment of the Delhi Development Act 1957, followed by the 
promulgation of the Master Plan in 1962 (MPD-62). 
      
5. The MPD-62 set out the broad vision for the development of Delhi and, 
with a view to realizing the development plan underlying this vision, a 
scheme of Large Scale Acquisition and Development of Land was also 
formulated. The aim of the latter was to ensure that the spatial pattern of 
development, and use of land, could conform to the development plan, 
and infrastructure and services could be laid out to match the same. At 
that early stage, the process of planned development was envisaged as a 
public sector led process with very little private partic ipation in terms of 
development of both shelter and infrastructure services. The philosophy 
of public sector/government led growth and development process 
continued in general till the process of economic reforms was initiated in 
the early Nineties. Therefore, the Master Plan 2001 (MPD-2001) also 
substantially reiterated the planning process, which had been outlined in 
MPD-62. These plans could be seen mainly as Land Use Plans with a 
three level hierarchy of the Master Plan, Zonal Plans and Layout Plans for 
specific development schemes within each zone 
      
6. The Master Plan 2021 would be the first plan of the 21st Century and, 
considering the limited land area of Delhi, there would be limited scope 
thereafter for pure new urbanization and the related spatial development 
and land use planning. It is necessary, therefore, to briefly review and 
analyze some of the achievements, shortfalls and difficulties during the 
implementation of the MPD-62 and MPD-2001 at this juncture. Such an 
exercise should be seen as introspection, which could lead to the 
development of sound basic policies and strategies, which should inform 
both the Master Plan and the methodology of its implementation. 
      
7. Some of the broad parameters in the light of which a review could be 
usefully done would relate to the extent and validity of population 
projections, quantum of land needed for development as per the Plans and 
the extent to which this actually became available, quantitative and 
qualitative targets for the development of shelter and the required 
infrastructure services and the actual achievements in this regard, and 
other important developments which were not anticipated, but impinge 
heavily on the entire process of the planned development of Delhi. 
      
8. The population of Delhi in 2001 was 137.8 lakhs as against the MPD-2001 
projection of 128 lakhs. This has had its inevitable implications and impact 
in terms of shelter, including squatter settlements, and other infrastructure 
facilities, etc.    
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9. As regards the actual acquisition and development of land, studies made 
for the preparation of MPD-2021 show that there have been large gaps 
between the area targeted for, and/or actually acquired, as also between 
the area acquired and that, which could be developed. This has had 
implications, at one level, in terms of shortfalls in the planned 
development of shelter and allied facilities and, at another, in terms of the 
growth of unauthorized colonies, particularly on lands which may have 
been notified for acquisition but could not actually be acquired. In turn, 
this position is indicative of limitations of resources- financial, physical 
and human, on the one hand, and of the procedural and other difficulties, 
bottlenecks and delays in the process of land assembly for the purposes of 
Planned Development, on the other. 
     
9.1 Another vital aspect stemming from the whole scheme of declaration of 
large areas as Development Areas, under the Delhi Development Act, 
coupled with the scheme of large scale acquisition and development, is 
that no constructio n can be done by any person or organization without 
the approval of the DDA which, in turn, has not been possible largely 
because of non-submission of proper layout and development plans etc. 
This has also been substantially responsible for the growth of unplanned 
and unauthorized colonies. Some issues that arise for consideration in this 
backdrop are:- 
      
i)  A review of the scheme of large scale development and acquisition and 
its relevance in the present context; 
ii)  Development of alternatives options for develop ment of areas 
identified for urbanization in MPD-2021 without having to depend upon 
acquisition and development of land by the DDA or any other public 
sector authority: 
iii) Evolving a system under which planning for, and provision of basic 
infrastructure could take place simultaneously with reference to (i) and (ii) 
above; and 
iv) Generally involving the private sector in the assembly and development 
of land and provision of infrastructure services. 
      
10. One of the most important aspects of planned development pertains to 
the provision of adequate, and well provisioned, shelter and housing for 
the different categories of inhabitants of the city. The studies carried out 
for the formulation of MPD-2021 have revealed quantitative and 
qualitative shortages and deficiencies in this regard. The provision of 
shelter has been predominantly in realm of the public sector. The limited 
participation of the private sector in the development of housing has been 
through the medium of co- operative group housing societies, who are 
being allotted land, mainly in the urban extension areas by the DDA. 
There are obvious limitations to the extent to which housing can actually 
be provided by public sector agencies alone, and there is an urgent need to 
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see how the involvement of the private sector in this sphere can be 
significantly stepped up. In turn, this should also be seen in concert with 
the involvement of the private sector in land assembly and development. 
      
11. Two major challenges which have emerged in the wake of the 
developments outlined above relate to the phenomenon of unauthorized 
colonies and squatter / jhuggi jhompari settlements. Both these will 
require planned measures, not only to deal with these phenomena in their 
present manifestation, but also in terms of future growth and 
proliferation. 
      
12. The exercises done for the MPD-2021 also show that there is a need for 
redevelopment, and even densification of the existing urban areas, both in 
terms of improvement of the housing stock and increasing the capacity to 
host additional population, as also with reference to overall urban design 
and city improvement. This aspect would need to be a major component 
of the new Master Plan, and a comprehensive redevelopment strategy for 
accommodating a larger population, strengthening o f infrastructure 
facilities, creation of more open spaces, and generally with reference to 
urban design, would need to be developed and implemented. An 
important aspect which needs consideration in this context is the need for 
re-densification / intensific ation and redevelopment along the MRTS 
corridors, so that the synergy between work and residences and, generally, 
between transportation and urban development could be achieved. 
      
13. Another important development observed during the period of the last 
Master Plan is the unanticipated phenomenal growth of automobiles in 
Delhi. This has resulted in a variety of serious problems pertaining to 
congestion, pollution, safety of travel, etc., which will need to be squarely 
addressed. 
      
14. It also needs to be understood that the National Capital Territory (NCT) 
of Delhi has a total area of only 1483 sq. kms. and is surrounded by the 
States of Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Keeping in view the fact 
that the NCT of Delhi would always act as a magnet for the people from 
all over the country, apart from the fact that there is a sizable requirement 
of land on account of its being the seat of the National Government, the 
need for a concept of the National Capital Region (NCR) was recognized 
even before MPD-2001 was promulgated and the National Capital Region 
Planning Board Act was enacted in 1985. The logic underlying this would 
be self evident i.e. to see that the development of Delhi should be seen in 
a spatial context going beyond its geographical boundaries in a seamless 
manner, inter alia, to ensure that the core of the NCT could be developed 
as a sustainable world-class city and, at the same time ensuring proper 
planning and development in the adjoining regional areas. Apart from 
assessing the physical aspects of what may have been achieved in the light 
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of these goals, it would also be important to see whether the existing 
statutory provisions are adequate to realize the basic objectives underlying 
the concept of the National Capital Region. 
      
15. The NCT of Delhi had been divided into 15 Zones from A to P, of which 
8 Zones are in the urban area, one in River bed and remaining 6 in the 
rural area. So far, Zonal Plans in respect of 7 zones have been notified by 
the Government of India, whereas in the case of number of others, which 
also include Urban Extension areas like Dwarka, Rohini and Narela, the 
complete Zonal Plans remain to be notified and the process of planning 
and development has been carried out through change of land use etc., in 
terms of specific development plans that may be prepared for specific 
areas within these zones. There are reasons for this, but there is, 
nevertheless, a need for a methodology by which the Zonal Plans can be 
expeditiously prepared in the context of MPD-2021 in a manner which 
would be conducive to their actual and timely realization. 
      
16. Another important development of which cognizance would need to be 
taken at this stage, pertains to the need for the involvement of the 
citizenry, through their representatives, in the process of planning. 
Therefore, at a procedural level, which would also necessarily have 
substantive implications, steps would have to be taken to involve the local 
representatives and institutions at the appropriate level in terms of the 
hierarchies of planning mentioned earlier. 
      
17. The experience of the past two Master Plans also shows that while 
projections regarding various basic infrastructure services have been made 
with reference to the population growth projections and the related 
increased urbanization requirements, there has been very little practical 
convergence between the Master Plan and the actual development of 
infrastructure services. An important element would, therefore, have to be 
brought in to bring greater convergence between these two aspects, 
particularly in the areas, which would be taken up for fresh urbanization. 
      
18. Finally, there are two important aspects pertaining to the actual 
implementation of the Master Plan, note of which would need to be taken. 
Enforcement of the Master Plan provisions is an area which will require 
much more focussed attention at all levels. One aspect of this pertains to 
the legal framework and actual implementation and enforcement of the 
legal provisions. The other aspect relates to the practicality and current 
relevance of some of the provisions in the Building Byelaws, etc., and the 
need for flexibility so that the provisions of the Master Plan do not 
themselves become a stumbling block or otherwise leave scope for their 
violation. 
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PRE-PLANNING CONSULTATIONS 
      
19. Democratic procedure and statutory obligations require that the Master 
Plan be prepared after obtaining the views, suggestions and objections of 
the public. Keeping this in view, extensive consultations were done at the 
pre-planning stage with the people, local bodies, government and public 
sector agencies, professional groups, resident welfare associations and 
elected representatives, etc. over a period of nearly five years, through a 
number of seminars, conferences, etc. 
      
20. The Ministry of Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation also issued the 
Guidelines in July 2003, for the Master Plan for Delhi 2021.The 
Guidelines were widely disseminated through the Media, Resident Welfare 
Associations, Traders Associations, Experts, Professional Bodies and 
individuals with a view to get suggestions from public. Nearly 2000 
responses were received, which have duly been considered. 
      
The indicative Perspective plans of infrastructure services prepared by the 
concerned agencies are annexed with MPD- 2021, which are subject to 
finalisation and approval of competent authority. 
      
21. 21. The Master Plan can be seen as an elaborate set of do’s and don’ts, and 
its success depends on conversion of the policies and strategies outlined in 
it into time bound development and action plans, periodic reviews and 
close monitoring, and on the people’s will and willingness to adhere to 
discipline in the use of land, roads, public space and infrastructure. 
 
 
